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CAPITAL  PUNISHMENT  OF  UNINTENTIONAL 
FELONY  MURDER 
Guyora Binder, Brenner Fissell & Robert Weisberg* 
ABSTRACT 
Under the prevailing interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in the lower courts, a defen-
dant who causes a death inadvertently in the course of a felony is eligible for capital punishment. 
This unfortunate interpretation rests on an unduly mechanical reading of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona, which require culpability for capital 
punishment of co-felons who do not kill.  The lower courts have drawn the unwarranted inference 
that these cases permit execution of those who cause death without any culpability towards death. 
This Article shows that this mechanical reading of precedent is mistaken, because the underlying 
justifications of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence require a rational selection for death of only 
the most deserving and deterrable offenders, and this in turn requires an assessment of culpabil-
ity.  We argue that the Supreme Court should address this open question in Eighth Amendment 
law and that it should correct the lower courts by imposing a uniform requirement of at least 
recklessness with respect to death for capital punishment of felony murder. 
INTRODUCTION 
That a defendant could be executed for causing death inadvertently 
might seem absurd.  Nevertheless, the great majority of American courts to 
have considered the question have concluded that the Eighth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution permits such executions.  In so doing, they have inter-
preted Supreme Court doctrine to allow capital punishment of any person 
who causes death during the commission of a felony, regardless of that per-
son’s mental state with respect to the resultant death.  Under this reading of 
precedent, the following defendants are eligible for the death penalty: the 
driver of a getaway car who kills a jaywalker, the burglar who startles an eld-
erly homeowner and causes a fatal heart attack, and the robber who unknow-
ingly punches a hemophiliac. 
© 2017 Guyora Binder, Brenner Fissell & Robert Weisberg.  Individuals and nonprofit 
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below 
cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a 
citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice. 
* Guyora Binder is a SUNY Distinguished Professor and the Vice Dean for Research 
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Scholar at Georgetown University Law Center; Robert Weisberg is the Edwin E. 
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Such counterintuitive results become conceivable when eligibility for the 
death penalty is untethered from the defendant’s culpability.  This discon-
nect results from an overly mechanical interpretation of the Supreme Court’s 
two key cases applying the Eighth Amendment to the felony murder context: 
Enmund v. Florida1 and Tison v. Arizona.2  Although these cases have been 
read to permit execution of nonculpable killers, the holdings of both deci-
sions impose a high level of culpability for execution of accomplices in felony 
murder, on the ground that death should be reserved for the most culpable 
offenders.  In overturning the death sentence of an accomplice in a fatal 
felony, the Enmund majority stated that a participant in a fatal felony is ineli-
gible for capital punishment if he “does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or 
intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.”3  In 
upholding the death sentences of two accomplices in a fatal felony, the Tison 
majority permitted capital punishment of felons “whose participation is 
major and whose mental state is one of reckless indifference to the value of 
human life.”4
Thus, subsequent readings of Enmund and Tison that permit the execu-
tion of actual killers regardless of culpability are largely based on what they 
did not say about a question that was not before them.  To be sure, the 
Enmund majority did not say that those who “kill” are eligible only if they 
intend death, but neither did it say they are eligible regardless of their 
mental state.  The Tison majority concluded that Enmund “held” that capital 
punishment could be imposed on “the felony murderer who actually killed,”5 
but only “when the circumstances warranted.”6  Because both cases con-
cerned accomplices of intentional killers, neither Court specified whether 
those who “killed” included all who caused death, by any means, and with any 
mental state.  Yet most lower courts have assumed that anyone causing death 
in a predicate felony is death-eligible, regardless of any culpability. 
Omitting consideration of a culpable mental state is at odds with a cen-
tral background principle of Eighth Amendment law: that we may only exe-
cute people to advance deterrence and retribution and that neither can be 
furthered if the person does not act with culpability.  Culpability is the essen-
tial inquiry when narrowing the class of murderers to those who are most 
deserving of death, yet a mechanical reading of the Enmund-Tison test seems 
to allow for execution without it.  This is the tension—familiar to any law-
yer—between the mechanical application of a legal rule and fidelity to the 
rule’s animating justifications. 
In this Article, we both diagnose this problem (previously unremarked 
by legal scholarship) and attempt to solve it.  First, we summarize the opera-
tion of felony murder rules and the considerations that might justify severe 
1 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
2 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
3 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797. 
4 Tison, 481 U.S. at 152. 
5 Id. at 150. 
6 Id. 
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penalties for felony murder.  Next, we examine the further problem of justi-
fying capital punishment of felony murder as proportionate under the 
Eighth Amendment.  At this point, the essential conundrum becomes appar-
ent—the Eighth Amendment appears to require substantial culpability for 
capital punishment, yet Enmund and Tison appear to require culpability only 
for some capital murders.  We then discuss two ways to read these cases.  One 
possibility is to read them mechanically, permitting execution of one who 
causes death inadvertently in committing predicate felonies.  Another is to 
understand that the conflict between this result and Eighth Amendment 
principles invoked in these very cases invites a more reflective approach. 
This more reflective interpretation would acknowledge the inadvertent 
actual killer as an open question, to which Eighth Amendment principles 
remain to be applied. 
After presenting this dilemma, we review the application of Enmund and 
Tison in the lower courts, showing how the reflective interpretation we rec-
ommend was soon displaced by the mechanical interpretation that now 
prevails.  In the years immediately after Enmund was decided, a number of 
courts assumed that the principles invoked in that case required an assess-
ment of the culpability of killers as well as their accomplices.  Today, how-
ever, rather than considering how Eighth Amendment principles apply to 
capital punishment of inadvertent causation of death, most courts simply pre-
sume actual killers to be death-eligible, citing Enmund and Tison. 
The mechanical interpretation of these cases has taken three forms. 
Some courts read these cases as explicitly holding that the Eighth Amend-
ment permits execution of inadvertent killers.7  This unjustifiably broadens 
the holdings of these cases, which left open the question of the culpability 
required for execution of actual killers. 
Other courts read the holdings of these cases more narrowly, as not 
applying to actual killers.  Yet they also ignore the Eighth Amendment princi-
ples justifying these holdings.  In treating Enmund and Tison as inapplicable 
to killers, these courts treat the Eighth Amendment itself as inapplicable.8
A third group acknowledges that execution of inadvertent killers may 
offend Eighth Amendment principles, but reasons that discretionary deci-
sionmaking will generally prevent such executions.9  Indeed, we will see that 
most death sentences upheld on the ground that felony murderers are death-
eligible regardless of culpability could also have been justified on the ground 
that the defendant killed recklessly.  Yet the rarity of death sentences for 
inadvertent killing only reinforces the claim that such sentences are 
disproportionate.10
7 See infra Section IV.B. 
8 See infra Section IV.C. 
9 See infra Section IV.D. 
10 See infra text accompanying note 228; see also Section IV.E.  That such sentences are 
rarely imposed supports arguments that they would violate “evolving standards of 
decency,” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), and would be arbitrary in the sense 
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Having shown the dominance of the mechanical interpretation, we next 
show why it is wrong—not because it offends our moral views, but because it 
ignores the doctrinal pronouncements of the Supreme Court.  The Court’s 
own decisions have required that capital punishment serve retribution and 
deterrence by punishing culpable conduct, and have reserved death for the 
worst crimes and the most culpable criminals.  These decisions authorize 
lower courts to condition capital punishment on a culpable mental state of at 
least reckless indifference to human life for all defendants convicted of fel-
ony murder, including actual killers.11  Yet, a better solution is for the 
Supreme Court to finally answer the question left open in Enmund and Tison, 
by making such a requirement explicit. 
Why should the Supreme Court bother to bar capital sentences for inad-
vertent killers if, as we concede, such sentences are rarely imposed and even 
more rarely executed?  There are two reasons.  First, because the threat of 
disproportionate capital punishment can force a plea to a noncapital charge. 
Second, because even one disproportionate execution is one too many. 
Eighth Amendment violations need not be frequent to be worth correcting 
and preventing.  Executions are—by design—rare.12  Disproportionate exe-
cution is an important problem, not because it is a big problem, but because 
it is a matter of life and death. 
of being “wanton” and “freakish,” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
11 At this point we say “at least recklessness” to distinguish two differing levels of reck-
lessness.  What we might call “simple recklessness” is that defined in Model Penal Code 
§ 2.02: a person is reckless when he 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material ele-
ment exists or will result from his conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the 
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the 
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s 
situation. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  In regard to homicide, that level 
of recklessness establishes involuntary manslaughter, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1980), but a nonpurposeful killing can establish murder under MPC § 210.2 if 
the killer acted “recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life,” id. § 210.2.  What thus can be called “gross recklessness” presumably 
means that either the degree of risk, the degree of conscious adversion to risk, or the lack 
of justification (i.e., the disutility of the actor’s motive) are more severe than what suffices 
for simple recklessness.  The higher recklessness required for murder is most often condi-
tioned on either the exposure of multiple potential victims to risk, or a particularly antiso-
cial motivation for imposing risk.  We will argue that a plausible reading of the Eighth 
Amendment cases would call for a minimal constitutional test of some version of gross 
recklessness; but insofar as felony murder is conditioned on a felonious (and so antisocial) 
end, a constitutional requirement of simple recklessness towards death arguably suffices to 
condition death-eligibility on one interpretation of gross recklessness. 
12 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008) (“In reaching our conclu-
sion [barring capital punishment of child rape] we find significant the number of execu-
tions that would be allowed under respondent’s approach.  The crime of child rape, 
considering its reported incidents, occurs more often than first-degree murder.”). 
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I. FELONY MURDER LIABILITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 
Eighth Amendment law justifies capital punishment, and its imposition 
in particular cases, on the basis of two purposes only: retribution and deter-
rence.13  It limits capitally punishable offenses against persons to murder, 
deeming no other crime sufficiently culpable or harmful to merit this 
extreme penalty.14  Finally, it conditions death on proof of at least one cir-
cumstance distinguishing the offense as worse than other murders.15 
Accordingly, determining when Eighth Amendment principles justify 
capital punishment of felony murder requires understanding what felony 
murder involves and how it compares with other forms of murder. 
Felony murder rules impose murder liability on those who cause death 
(usually foreseeably) in the commission or attempt of certain felonies.  These 
felonies are usually either enumerated by statute or limited to those commit-
ted in a way foreseeably dangerous to human life.16  Most enumerated predi-
cate felonies inherently involve violence or danger to life—robbery, rape, 
arson, kidnapping, and escape are among the most common.17  In death 
penalty jurisdictions, death-eligible felony murders are usually predicated on 
enumerated felonies.18  Felony murder liability often does not require proof 
of a culpable mental state with respect to the victim’s death, although 
requirements of foreseeable causation and dangerousness to life effectively 
require negligent disregard of danger to life.19 
In addition to imposing liability on those causing death, a felony murder 
rule may extend liability to other participants in the felony who meet certain 
criteria.  In most felony murder jurisdictions, accomplices in a fatal felony are 
also accomplices in felony murder if a co-felon caused death by conduct 
undertaken in furtherance of and foreseeable as a result of the felony.20  By 
conditioning complicity in felony murder on the foreseeability of death as a 
result of the felony, such rules require of accomplies the same negligent dis-
regard of the danger of death usually required for the killer’s causal responsi-
bility.  In a minority of jurisdictions, no distinction is drawn between felons 
13 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
14 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion); see JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF  MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION 321–25 (1907) (discussing harm and culpability as the components of desert); David 
Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 359, 367–69 (1985) (same). 
15 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 
(1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (plurality 
opinion). 
16 Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403, 415 (2011). 
17 Although one prevalent predicate felony—burglary—usually involves very little dan-
ger to life. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, at 38 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
18 See generally David McCord, Should Commission of a Contemporaneous Arson, Burglary, 
Kidnapping, Rape, or Robbery Be Sufficient to Make a Murderer Eligible for a Death Sentence?—An 
Empirical and Normative Analysis, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2009). 
19 See Binder, supra note 16, at 484–87. 
20 Id. at 484. 
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who cause death and their co-felons: all participants in a predicate felony that 
causes death (again, usually foreseeably) are liable as principals in felony 
murder.21 
While felony murder requires a death and an attempted or completed 
felony, it is generally considered a homicide offense rather than an aggra-
vated grade of the predicate felony.  Felony murder is grouped with other 
forms of murder in criminal codes.22  Since killing during an attempted fel-
ony suffices for felony murder liability, felony murder does not require all 
the elements of the completed felony.  Since the felony does not require 
death, it does not require all the elements of felony murder.  This means that 
under the prevailing test for double jeopardy, a felony murder conviction 
need not bar conviction for the completed felony.23  On such reasoning, 
about half the felony murder jurisdictions have determined that the predi-
cate felony can be punished in addition to the felony murder.24  If the harm 
ascribed to felony murder is death only, it does the same harm as any other 
homicide.25  If instead, we conceive felony murder as a compound crime, 
combining a homicide with a predicate felony or attempt, felony murder 
involves the additional harm of the completed or attempted felony.26 
21 Id. at 484–86. 
22 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2013). 
23 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
24 See Todd v. State, 917 P.2d 674, 683 (Alaska 1996); State v. Siddle, 47 P.3d 1150 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213, 260–61 (Cal. 1997); State v. Rose, 33 
A.3d 765, 777 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011); Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1371 (Del. 1981); 
Brinson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1075, 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Sivak v. State, 731 P.2d 
192, 206, 208 (Idaho 1986); State v. Rhode, 503 N.W.2d 27, 40–41 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993); 
State v. Waller, 328 P.3d 1111, 1126 (Kan. 2014); State v. Reardon, 486 A.2d 112, 121 (Me. 
1984); People v. Ream, 750 N.W.2d 536, 547 (Mich. 2008); Walker v. State, 394 N.W.2d 
192, 200 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Barker, 410 S.W.3d 225, 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); 
State v. Turner, 877 P.2d 978, 983 (Mont. 1994); Talancon v. State, 721 P.2d 764, 768 (Nev. 
1986); People v. Lucas, 481 N.Y.S.2d 789, 792 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); State v. McClary, 679 
N.W.2d 455, 464 (N.D. 2004); State v. Campbell, 738 N.E.2d 1178, 1205 (Ohio 2000); Com-
monwealth v. Harper, 516 A.2d 319, 320 (Pa. 1986) (per curiam); State v. Garza, 854 
N.W.2d 833, 841–42 (S.D. 2014); State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 777–78 (Tenn. 2001); 
State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Utah 1990); Spain v. Commonwealth, 373 S.E.2d 
728, 731–32 (Va. Ct. App. 1988). 
25 See JOHN  KAPLAN, ROBERT  WEISBERG & GUYORA  BINDER, CRIMINAL  LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 472–73 (6th ed. 2008). 
26 About half of felony murder jurisdictions to have considered the issue bar the pun-
ishment of both the predicate felony and the felony murder as double punishment. See 
Washington v. State, No. CR-13-1369, 2015 WL 6443149, at *4–5 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 
2015); Boulies v. People, 770 P.2d 1274, 1281 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); Sumrall v. State, 442 
S.E.2d 246, 247 (Ga. 1994); People v. Gillespie, 23 N.E.3d 641, 645–49 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); 
Stewart v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1277, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Staden, 154 So. 3d 
579, 582–83 (La. Ct. App. 2014); Newton v. State, 373 A.2d 262, 266, 269 (Md. 1977); 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 407 N.E.2d 1229, 1250 (Mass. 1980); Williams v. State, 94 So. 3d 
324, 329 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011); State v. McHenry, 550 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Neb. 1996); State 
v. Arriagas, 487 A.2d 1290, 1292 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); State v. Best, 674 S.E.2d 
467, 474 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009); Perry v. State, 764 P.2d 892, 898 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); 
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Today, jurisdictions imposing felony murder liability usually define mur-
der as also including causing death with intent to kill or with gross reckless-
ness towards a risk of death.27  Thus, a felony murder rule extends liability 
beyond traditional murder to those who cause death in the pursuit of a fel-
ony and their accomplices, without one of these mental states.  Arguably, 
then, it involves the same harm as other murder (death), but less culpability 
with respect to that harm (negligence rather than gross recklessness or 
intent).  Nevertheless, it imposes a similarly severe penalty. 
How can this severe penalty be justified?  Felony murder liability has 
many critics who see murder liability as unjustifiable without intent or gross 
recklessness with respect to death.28  Some critics have gone so far as to claim 
that ordinary (noncapital) felony murder liability is unconstitutionally dis-
proportionate.  For example, in an article dating from the era of the Enmund 
and Tison decisions, Nelson Roth and Scott Sundby characterized felony 
murder as a form of strict liability and pointed to two lines of cases implying 
that strict liability could not be imposed for a serious crime.29  Decisions 
reading mental elements into federal statutory offense definitions argued 
that proof of culpability should be required for severely punished crimes, to 
avoid possible violation of due process.30  In addition, Eighth Amendment 
cases, including Enmund, treated culpability as important in justifying both 
death and prolonged imprisonment as proportional.31  Accordingly, they 
concluded, felony murder rules violated a constitutional requirement that 
severe punishment be conditioned on culpability.32 
From this perspective, death is disproportionate for felony murder, 
because any severe punishment is disproportionate for felony murder.  On 
this view, the dubious practice is not imposing capital punishment for felony 
State v. Lyons, 924 P.2d 802 (Or. 1996); State v. Villani, 491 A.2d 976, 981 (R.I. 1985); 
Littrell v. State, 271 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); State v. Womac, 160 P.3d 40, 
48 (Wash. 2007) (en banc); State v. Jenkins, 729 S.E.2d 250, 259 (W. Va. 2012); State v. 
Krawczyk, 657 N.W.2d 77, 85 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 552 
(Wyo. 1993). 
27 GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW 229–34 
(2016). 
28 See Binder, supra note 16, at 422 (“Influential critics like Herbert Wechsler and 
Sanford Kadish have charged that ‘[p]rincipled argument in favor of the felony-murder 
doctrine is hard to find’ because it is ‘rationally indefensible.’” (alteration in original) 
(first quoting MODEL  PENAL  CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 37 (AM. LAW  INST. 1980); and then 
quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 679, 695 (1994))). 
29 Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional 
Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1985). 
30 See id. at 466–67; see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437–38 
(1978); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, 250 (1952); Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921); Holdridge v. United States, 282 
F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960). 
31 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 
(1982). 
32 Roth & Sundby, supra note 29, at 492. 
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murder, but imposing felony murder liability itself.  Yet this position some-
what overstates the demands of Eighth Amendment proportionality and 
somewhat understates the culpability implicit in felony murder.  Thus, ordi-
nary felony murder liability can be defended as proportionate in three ways. 
Felony murder rules are sheltered from constitutional challenge by their 
long persistence, widespread prevalence, and regular application.33  Propor-
tionality review generally scrutinizes only penal practices sufficiently unusual 
to violate “evolving standards of decency.”34  Similarly, due process review 
protects only those procedural rights traditional enough to have become 
essential to “ordered liberty.”35 
Second, Eighth Amendment review of lengthy terms of incarceration is 
less concerned with culpability than Eighth Amendment review of death 
sentences.  Culpability is particularly relevant to two purposes of punishment: 
desert and deterrence.  All else equal, the more culpable wrongdoer obvi-
ously deserves more blame.  Similarly, the more culpable wrongdoer is gener-
ally more aware of the consequences of his act and so more deterrable by the 
threat of punishment.  By contrast, incapacitation and rehabilitation are 
more concerned with the defendant’s personality and future conduct than 
with the crime itself.  While death sentences must be justified as serving 
desert and deterrence only, the Supreme Court permits terms of imprison-
ment to be justified by reference to the purposes of incapacitation or rehabil-
itation.36  On this basis, the Court has upheld life terms for such nonviolent 
offenses as theft and cocaine possession.37  If lengthy terms of imprisonment 
need not be deserved, and if the crimes punished thereby need not be deter-
rable, it seems those crimes need not be culpable. 
A third obstacle to a proportionality challenge to felony murder liability 
is provided by arguments that felony murder liability in fact depends on cul-
pability.  Courts most often explain felony murder liability in one of two ways: 
(1) that culpability with respect to death is present because of the foreseeable 
dangerousness of the predicate felony, or (2) that the culpability of the pred-
33 According to GUYORA  BINDER, FELONY  MURDER 190, 307 n.64 (2012), forty-three 
states, the United States, and the District of Columbia impose felony murder liability.  By 
the end of the nineteenth century, most states had passed felony murder statutes or inter-
preted murder grading provisions to impose felony murder liability. Id. at 136. 
34 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see also Graham v. Flor-
ida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010) (holding that proportionality review of sentencing practices 
requires a threshold judgment that the practice is rare). 
35 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969); see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908). 
36 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
37 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (affirming fifty years to life for theft); Ewing, 
538 U.S. at 28 (affirming twenty-five years to life for theft); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 996 (1991) (affirming life without parole for cocaine possession).  For criticism of the 
Supreme Court’s reliance on incapacitation, see Guyora Binder & Ben Notterman, Penal 
Incapacitation: A Situationist Critique, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (2017); Youngjae Lee, The 
Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677 (2005). 
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icate felony substitutes for culpability towards death.38  While neither of 
these rationales is convincing in isolation, they can be combined to make a 
stronger argument. 
By itself, the foreseeable danger rationale is insufficient to justify murder 
liability because the foreseeable dangerousness of predicate felonies guaran-
tees only negligence with respect to death, which falls short of the intent to 
kill or gross recklessness otherwise required for murder. 
Similarly, the substituted culpability rationale seems insufficient to justify 
the felony murder doctrine by itself.  The intent to commit the felony is 
already included in the predicate felony or attempt, for which the defendant 
can be separately punished in many jurisdictions.  Moreover, there is no rea-
son to punish the resultant death as well, unless the defendant is culpable for 
that result.  Nor can the intent to commit the predicate felony be treated as 
equal in culpability to the intent to kill—in limiting capital punishment of 
crimes against individuals to homicides, the Court has made clear that the 
crimes of rape, child sexual abuse, and robbery deserve less punishment than 
the crime of murder.39  Indeed, the Court concluded that “in determining 
whether the death penalty is excessive, there is a distinction between inten-
tional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against 
individual persons.”40 
When we combine the foreseeable danger of the felony with its criminal 
purpose, however, we have a rationale for severely punishing a homicide: 
“[F]elony murder involves two kinds of culpability: negligently imposing a 
significant and apparent risk of death, and doing so for a very bad reason.”41 
Insofar as felony murder is conditioned on proof of a foreseeably dangerous 
felony and foreseeable causation of death, it requires proof of negligence. 
This culpability makes felony murderers morally responsible for the deaths 
for which they are punished.  And while felonious motives do not alone suf-
fice to justify murder liability, they can enhance the culpability of negligent 
wrongdoing.  Motives often affect assessments of culpability.  As the Court 
observed in Solem v. Helm, “A court . . . is entitled to look at a defendant’s 
motive in committing a crime.  Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious 
38 See Roth & Sundby, supra note 29, at 460. Some courts offer a third rationale that 
does not depend on culpability: that holding felons strictly liable for accidental death 
deters predicate felonies or deters their careless commission.  However, this deterrence 
rationale is weak.  Because certain punishment deters more effectively than severe punish-
ment, punishment lotteries do not deter efficiently.  Thus, punishing an occasional unex-
pected death severely is a poor way to deter conduct creating a risk of death, including 
felonies. See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: 
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143 (2003). 
39 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (rape of a child); Enmund v. Florida, 
458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (robbery); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion) (rape of an adult woman). 
40 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 438 (emphasis added). 
41 BINDER, supra note 33, at 38. 
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when committed pursuant to a contract.”42  Similarly, the Model Penal Code 
conditions negligence and recklessness on willingness to impose a risk that is 
not only “substantial,” but also “unjustifiable.”43  Reckless homicide is aggra-
vated from manslaughter to murder in many jurisdictions by a particularly 
cruel attitude or an antisocial purpose.44  Finally, intentional murder can be 
aggravated to capital murder by a motive of financial gain, bigotry, or 
cruelty.45 
Adding a felonious motive to the negligent imposition of a risk of death 
yields more culpability.  “Thus felony murder liability rests on a simple and 
powerful idea: that the guilt incurred in attacking or endangering others 
depends on one’s reasons for doing so.”46  Paul Robinson’s and John 
Darley’s empirical study of popular views of moral desert provided some evi-
dence that the public views felony murder in this way.  Their subjects were 
willing to sentence negligent killers to twenty-five-year terms if the killing was 
in the course of armed robbery.47  The most persuasive account of felony 
murder is that, when properly imposed, it combines two dimensions of culpa-
bility: the negligent imposition of a substantial risk of death and the imposi-
tion of this risk for a felonious motive. 
In sum, felony murder is not a crime of strict liability.  Instead, it is a 
crime of careless violence in the pursuit of a felonious end.  Indeed, this is 
precisely how the Supreme Court has described the culpability that, from the 
standpoint of the Eighth Amendment, justifies felony murder liability, but 
fails to justify capital liability.  In Tison v. Arizona, Justice O’Connor 
explained: 
[T]he Arizona Supreme Court attempted to reformulate “intent to kill” as a 
species of foreseeability.  The Arizona Supreme Court wrote: 
“Intend [ sic] to kill includes the situation in which the defendant 
intended, contemplated, or anticipated that lethal force would or might be 
used or that life would or might be taken in accomplishing the underlying 
felony.” 
This definition of intent is broader than that described by the Enmund 
Court.  Participants in violent felonies like armed robberies can frequently 
“anticipat[e] that lethal force . . . might be used . . . in accomplishing the 
42 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293–94 (1983); see also Guyora Binder, The Rhetoric of 
Motive and Intent, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2002); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in 
Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89 (2006). 
43 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c)–(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
44 See, e.g., People v. Protopappas, 246 Cal. Rptr. 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Ramsey v. 
State, 154 So. 855 (Fla. 1934). 
45 See SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MAN-
SLAUGHTER 109–10 (1998) (discussing aggravated murder). 
46 Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE  DAME L. REV. 965, 968 
(2008). 
47 PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND  BLAME: COMMUNITY 
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 169–81 (1995) (noting that subjects would impose terms of 
approximately twenty-five years for negligent homicide in the course of an armed 
robbery). 
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underlying felony.”  Enmund himself may well have so anticipated.  Indeed, 
the possibility of bloodshed is inherent in the commission of any violent 
felony and this possibility is generally foreseeable and foreseen; it is one 
principal reason that felons arm themselves.  The Arizona Supreme Court’s 
attempted reformulation of intent to kill amounts to little more than a 
restatement of the felony-murder rule itself.48 
While killing foreseeably in furtherance of a grave felonious purpose 
may establish enough culpability to justify a lengthy term of incarceration as 
proportionate, that does not mean it suffices to justify capital punishment as 
proportionate, because proportionality review of death is more demanding. 
We now turn to that more challenging problem. 
II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR FELONY MURDER 
Justifying capital punishment as proportionate is more challenging than 
justifying prolonged incarceration as proportionate for four reasons.  First, 
death can only be justified on the basis of desert and deterrence, not incapac-
itation or rehabilitation.49  Accordingly, it must be conditioned on culpabil-
ity.  Second, among offenses against persons, the Court has reserved death 
for murder.50  Third, capital punishment is limited to a narrower class of 
murders aggravated by facts—such as greater culpability—bearing on desert 
and deterrence.51  Fourth, because execution is now very rare,52 application 
of the death penalty to any class of offenders may seem “cruel and unusual” 
in the sense of violating “evolving standards of decency.”53  Together, these 
considerations make it hard to justify death for felony murder, absent greater 
culpability than negligence towards death in the pursuit of a serious felony. 
If extended from accomplices in felony murder to actual killers, the 
holdings in Enmund and Tison offer a solution to this problem.  These deci-
48 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150–51 (1987) (second, third, fourth, and fifth alter-
ations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Tison, 690 P.2d 755, 757 (Ariz. 
1984) (en banc)). 
49 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 
(1976) (plurality opinion). 
50 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) 
(plurality opinion). 
51 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) 
(plurality opinion).  To justify greater punishment on grounds of desert or deterrence, 
these aggravators must distinguish the offense on the basis of greater culpability or greater 
harm. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 445–46 (punishing lesser harm more severely than greater 
harm creates perverse incentives to commit greater harm); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY 
OF  LEGISLATION 322–23 (1931) (arguing that deterrence requires that greater harm be 
punished more severely); Crump & Crump, supra note 14, at 367–69 (discussing desert as a 
function of harm and culpability). 
52 Executions by Year, DEATH  PENALTY  INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
executions-year (last updated Oct. 19, 2016) (indicating 1439 executions from 1976 to 
2016; 162 executions from 2012–2016). 
53 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see Enmund v. Florida, 
458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982). 
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sions restrict capital punishment of accomplices in fatal felonies to those 
whose mental states would suffice for murder liability without the felony mur-
der rule.  Such accomplices have the culpability required for ordinary mur-
der, plus an additional culpable mental state: a purpose to commit a very 
grave felony.  Intentional killers are not death-eligible unless their murders 
are aggravated by some other circumstance, such as a felonious motive.  By 
like reasoning, felony murderers should not be death-eligible unless their 
felony murders are aggravated by a culpable mental state of gross reckless-
ness or intent to kill.  Conditioning capital punishment of felony murder on 
recklessness accomplishes this because killing recklessly in the pursuit of an 
antisocial purpose is one common definition of gross recklessness.54  A grave 
felony is a very, very antisocial purpose.  It would follow that killing recklessly 
in the pursuit of such a felony includes and even exceeds one conception of 
gross recklessness.  Confining capital punishment of felony murder to reck-
less killings therefore ensures that capital felony murders will be in at least 
one respect worse than other felony murders and other grossly reckless 
murders.  Of course, confining capital punishment of felony murders to kill-
ers and accomplices who intended death would have the further benefit of 
ensuring that capital felony murders would be in one respect worse than 
other intentional murders.  However, this would require overturning Tison. 
A. General Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Proportionality Through Rational 
Selection of the Most Culpable, So as to Advance 
Deterrence and Retribution 
Our examination of the proportionality of capital punishment of felony 
murder begins with the proposition that the Eighth Amendment requires 
culpability for capital punishment.  The touchstone of the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment Clause is proportionality, and this demands rational selec-
tion of those who most deserve death. 
The Court bore witness to this principle in its 1976 decision in Roberts v. 
Louisiana, holding that the Constitution forbids the mandatory execution of 
all first-degree murderers.55  Instead, capital punishment must be limited to 
54 See, e.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (in bank) (explaining 
the felony murder doctrine is unnecessary where the defendant acted with a “base, anti-
social motive and with wanton disregard for human life” (quoting People v. Thomas, 261 
P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1953) (in bank) (Traynor, J., concurring))); see also People v. Protopappas, 
246 Cal. Rptr. 915, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a dentist’s egregious overdose of 
an anesthetic drug on a manifestly frail patient can prove “implied malice” so as to estab-
lish “abandoned and malignant heart” murder (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (1982))); 
Ramsey v. State, 154 So. 855, 856 (Fla. 1934) (en banc) (unintentional murder requires 
facts “evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life” (quoting COMP. GEN. LAWS 
§ 7137 (1927) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
55 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 13 22-MAR-17 13:12
2017] capital  punishment  of  unintentional  felony  murder 1153 
those offenders who commit “a narrow category of the most serious crimes,” 
and accordingly to those “most deserving of execution.”56 
Most death penalty jurisdictions satisfy these strictures by requiring the 
jury to find at least one aggravating circumstance at the sentencing phase.57 
Others permissibly use narrowing criteria at the guilt phase.58  In all cases, 
though, states must give precise definition to the aggravating factors that can 
result in a capital sentence so that the death penalty is reserved for a narrow 
category of crimes and offenders.59  These few may not be selected on an 
arbitrary basis60—they must be selected by criteria that not only “narrow the 
class of persons eligible for the death penalty” in numerical terms, but also 
“reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defen-
dant compared to others found guilty of murder.”61 
Moreover, the only reasons that have been recognized by the Supreme 
Court as adequate to “justify” the extreme penalty of death are “retribution 
and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”62  Unless the 
imposition of the death penalty “measurably contributes to one or both of 
these goals, it ‘is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition 
of pain and suffering,’ and hence an unconstitutional punishment.”63  This 
requirement of reasonably justified narrowing—in service to the deterrent 
and retributive purposes of punishment—defines the constitutional right to 
proportionality.  Each jurisdiction may assess desert and deterrence some-
what differently, but each must select defendants as death-eligible according 
to its own legislatively determined and consistently applied criteria of desert 
or deterrence. 
To rationally select those whose deaths further retribution or advance 
deterrence, though, requires an assessment of culpability.  The Court has 
denied that execution can serve either punitive purpose when the defendant 
lacks a culpable mental state: “Retribution is not proportional if the law’s 
most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness 
56 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
57 See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (plurality opinion) (reviewing 
Florida sentencing scheme); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 162–64 (1976) (plurality 
opinion) (reviewing Georgia sentencing scheme). 
58 See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988).  In Lowenfield, the sole aggravat-
ing circumstance was the fact that the defendant killed or endangered multiple victims. Id. 
at 235.  This circumstance was established by the defendant’s conviction on multiple mur-
der counts. Id.  The Court found that the underlying crime of murder was adequately 
narrowed by this finding, even though the finding took place at the guilt phase, because 
multiple murder is not a defining element of murder itself. Id. at 241; see also Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
59 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428–29 
(1980) (plurality opinion). 
60 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
61 Zant, 462 U.S. at 877. 
62 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183); Gregg, 
428 U.S. at 183. 
63 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion)). 
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 14 22-MAR-17 13:12
1154 notre dame law review [vol. 92:3 
is diminished . . . , [and] the same characteristics that render [certain 
defendants] less culpable . . . suggest as well that [certain defendants] will be 
less susceptible to deterrence.”64 
The connection between culpability and the retributive aim of punish-
ment is obvious—one who intentionally does wrong ought to be punished 
more than one who does wrong negligently, and one who does wrong with-
out fault usually deserves no punishment.65  This follows from the wide-
spread assumption that moral responsibility for wrongdoing depends on the 
exercise of choice.66  As Justice Jackson wrote in Morissette,
 The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted 
by intention is no provincial or transient notion.  It is as universal and persis-
tent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a 
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between 
good and evil.67 
Similarly intuitive is the proposition that deterrence is best advanced by 
conditioning punishment on culpability.  As Jeremy Bentham (a founder of 
deterrence theory) wrote, “Punishments are inefficacious when directed 
against individuals . . . who have acted without intention [or] who have done 
the evil innocently.”68  The less aware an actor is of violating the law, the less 
the actor can be influenced by the threat of a deterrent sanction. 
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court observed that subjecting the mentally 
retarded to the death penalty disserved both retribution and deterrence.69 
Stressing the relationship of culpability to the goal of retribution, the Court 
said: 
[T]he severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the 
culpability of the offender.  Since Gregg, our jurisprudence has consistently 
64 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
65 “In principle, we blame more severely intended wrongdoing than unintended 
wrongdoing.” LEO  ZAIBERT, FIVE  WAYS  PATRICIA  CAN  KILL  HER  HUSBAND: A THEORY OF 
INTENTIONALITY AND BLAME 245 (2005).  The drafters of the Model Penal Code explained 
their decision to limit strict liability to noncriminal violations in the following terms: 
“Crime does and should mean condemnation and no court should have to pass that judg-
ment unless it can declare that the defendant’s act was culpable.” MODEL  PENAL  CODE 
§ 2.05, at 282–83 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
66 MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 405–06 
(1997) (explaining the choice principle). 
67 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (footnote omitted). 
68 BENTHAM, supra note 51, at 322–23.  H.L.A. Hart famously disagreed, reasoning that 
absolving the undeterrable might encourage the deterrable to offend and feign undeter-
rability. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND  RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE  PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW (1968) [hereinafter HART, 1st ed.]; H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND  RESPONSIBILITY: 
ESSAYS IN THE  PHILOSOPHY OF  LAW 19 (2d ed. 2008).  However, this sort of speculation 
ignores Bentham’s premise that the social cost of punishment requires probable and sub-
stantial deterrent benefits to justify punishment.  In any case, “the best reading of the accu-
mulated data is that they do not establish a deterrent effect of the death penalty.”  Cass R. 
Sunstein & Justin Wolfers, A Death Penalty Puzzle, WASH. POST (June 30, 2008), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/29/AR2008062901476.html. 
69 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002). 
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confined the imposition of the death penalty to a narrow category of the 
most serious crimes. . . . If the culpability of the average murderer is insuffi-
cient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser 
culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form 
of retribution.70 
The Court also emphasized the connection between culpability and 
deterrence: “[I]t is the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that make 
these defendants less morally culpable . . . that also make it less likely that 
they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty 
and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that information.”71 
The Court similarly linked both retribution and deterrence to culpabil-
ity in Roper v. Simmons when it banned the death penalty for juveniles who 
committed their crimes while under the age of eighteen: 
Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed 
on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial 
degree, by reason of youth and immaturity. 
. . . “[T]he likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-
benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so 
remote as to be virtually nonexistent.”72 
The Court has not limited its application of the culpability requirement 
to cases of diminished mental capacity, though.  In Woodson v. North Carolina, 
a mandatory death penalty statute was found to violate the Eighth Amend-
ment by preventing individualized consideration of the offender.73  Noting 
that Woodson was a non-triggerman accomplice who waited in the getaway 
car during a fatal robbery, the plurality stated that “the 19th century move-
ment away from mandatory death sentences marked an enlightened intro-
duction of flexibility into the sentencing process.  It recognized that 
individual culpability is not always measured by the category of the crime 
committed.”74  Part of the problem of mandatory execution of murderers, 
then, was blindness to their individual culpability, and particularly in the con-
text of felony murder.  However, the Court did not reach “the question 
whether imposition of the death penalty on petitioner Woodson would have 
been so disproportionate to the nature of his involvement in the capital 
offense.”75 
Individual culpability was also an important concern in the Court’s deci-
sion in Lockett v. Ohio.76  Like Woodson, Lockett was an accomplice who 
70 Id. at 319. 
71 Id. at 320. 
72 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–72 (2005) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988) (plurality opinion)). 
73 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
74 Id. at 298 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402 (1972) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
75 Id. at 305 n.40. 
76 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
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remained in a getaway car during a fatal robbery.77  A state statute mandated 
the death penalty for aggravated murder (here, participation in a felony was 
one of the aggravators)78 unless the defendant could show insanity, duress, 
provocation, or victim consent.79  The Court overturned the death sentence 
“because the statute under which it was imposed did not permit the sentenc-
ing judge to consider, as mitigating factors, her character, prior record, age, 
lack of specific intent to cause death, and her relatively minor part in the 
crime.”80  However, the Court did not reach the question whether “the death 
penalty is constitutionally disproportionate for one who has not been proved 
to have taken life, to have attempted to take life, or to have intended to take 
life.”81 
In sum, the Eighth Amendment requires the rational selection of 
offenders worthiest of capital punishment, and this selection must be 
animated by considerations of retribution and deterrence.  These penal pur-
poses, in turn, can only be advanced when the central criterion of selection is 
mental culpability for the offense.  As we will see, in considering the capital 
punishment of felony murder, Enmund and Tison would also emphasize the 
importance of culpability as the measure of desert and the target of 
deterrence. 
B. Felony Murder Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
We have seen that culpability guides Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
more generally, and now we can turn to a discussion of how this guidance 
plays out in the context of felony murder more specifically.  Because the fact 
patterns in felony murder cases can vary widely with respect to the perpetra-
tor’s involvement in the killing and also with respect to his mental state, the 
Supreme Court has paid special attention to this type of homicide. 
1. Enmund v. Florida 
In Enmund v. Florida,82 an elderly couple was robbed and fatally shot by a 
younger couple who had stopped at their house asking for help with a dis-
abled vehicle.83  This younger couple “shot and killed both [members of the 
elderly couple], dragged them into the kitchen, and took their money and 
fled.”84 However, witnesses also identified a getaway driver who sat through 
these events in a car 200 yards from the house: Earl Enmund.85  The case 
77 Id. at 590. 
78 Id. at 589. 
79 Id. at 593–94. 
80 Id. at 597 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
81 Id. at 609 n.16. 
82 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
83 Id. at 784. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. Enmund was accompanied by Ida Jean Shaw, his common law wife and the 
mother of one of the killers. Id. Shaw apparently drove the car, which belonged to her 
and Enmund, to the scene of the crime. Id. 
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thus presented the question of how substantial the offender’s participation in 
and intent regarding the killing must be for capital punishment to be 
proportionate. 
First, the Court surveyed the existing state laws on felony murder and 
capital punishment.  It noted that in only twenty-one jurisdictions could fel-
ony murder be capitally punished without proof of intent or recklessness.86 
The Court added that “only a small minority of jurisdictions—eight—allow 
the death penalty to be imposed solely because the defendant somehow par-
ticipated in a robbery in the course of which a murder was committed.”87 
Thus, while “the current legislative judgment”88 was not “wholly unani-
mous,”89 it nevertheless weighed against the imposition of capital punish-
ment for that crime.90 
Next, the Court looked to the sentencing decisions of juries when faced 
with similar sets of facts and found that only six of 362 non-triggerman felony 
murder cases resulted in a death sentence.91  These six executions all took 
place in 1955, with none since.92  Moreover, the Court noted that of the 796 
(and analyzing the 739 for whom sufficient data was available) inmates on 
death row at the time, only forty-one were nonparticipants in the assault of 
the victim, and only three were sentenced absent a finding of intent to kill.93 
Of forty-five felony murderers on death row in Florida, thirty-six were found 
to have intended to kill.94  In eight other cases, no finding of intent was 
made, but the defendant was described as a “triggerman.”95  “In only one 
case—Enmund’s—there was no finding of an intent to kill and the defen-
dant was not the triggerman.”96 
Finally, the Court employed its own conceptual analysis of the justifica-
tions for capital punishment when applied to these circumstances.  Neither 
deterrence nor retribution—the hallmark justifications of punishment—war-
ranted a death sentence in Enmund’s case. 
“[C]apital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the 
result of premeditation and deliberation,” for if a person does not intend 
that life be taken or contemplate that lethal force will be employed by 
others, the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed for vicarious 
86 Id. at 789–90. 
87 Id. at 792. 
88 Id. at 792–93. 
89 Id. at 793 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977)). 
90 Id. at 793. 
91 Id. at 794. 
92 Id. at 794–95. 
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felony murder will not “enter into the cold calculus that precedes the deci-
sion to act.”97 
Similarly, the demands of retribution “very much depend[ ] on the 
degree of [the defendant’s] culpability”:98 
The focus must be on his culpability, not on that of those who committed 
the robbery and shot the victims . . . . Enmund did not kill or intend to kill 
and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who 
killed; yet the State treated them alike and attributed to Enmund the culpa-
bility of those who killed the [victims].  This was impermissible under the 
Eighth Amendment.99 
Thus, the Court regarded the actual killers as more deserving of death 
not merely because they killed, but because—under the facts of the case— 
their culpability was greater (both for the purposes of deterrence and retri-
bution).  All this led to the Enmund rule: Florida could not constitutionally 
impose a sentence of death “in the absence of proof that Enmund killed or 
attempted to kill, and regardless of whether Enmund intended or contem-
plated that life would be taken.”100  This confusing formulation may be read 
to imply that anyone who did kill is death-eligible regardless of culpability 
towards death.  However, this reading is not compelled.  It may also be read 
as requiring a mental state of at least “contemplating” the victim’s death for 
all death-eligible defendants, including killers. 
The majority opinion in Enmund was written by Justice White, who in 
Lockett v. Ohio101 wrote that “it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose the 
penalty of death without a finding that the defendant possessed a purpose to 
cause the death of the victim.”102  Moreover, in Enmund, Justice White sev-
eral times used the term “nontriggerman” to describe the category of people 
who did not “kill,” and so described Enmund himself.103  It seems that he 
viewed the actual killer as someone who does more than perform an act nec-
essary to the death.  Indeed, if we view all necessary conditions for a result as 
causes, Enmund, by supplying the car used to transport the killers to the 
scene of the felony, could be said to have thereby caused the deaths.  That 
Justice White distinguished “killing” from merely “causing death” is con-
firmed by his reference to “two killings that [Enmund] did not commit and 
had no intention of committing or causing.”104  Rather than embracing every-
one whose conduct was necessary to the death, it seems that “one who killed” 
97 Id. at 799 (citations omitted) (first quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); and then quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 
(1976) (plurality opinion)). 
98 Id. at 800. 
99 Id. at 798. 
100 Id. at 801. 
101 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
102 Id. at 624 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
judgment) (emphasis added). 
103 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 786 n.2, 792, 793–94 n.15, 794. 
104 Id. at 801 (emphasis added). 
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refers only to a “triggerman” who employed a deadly weapon.  Such a “trig-
german” may not have intended death, but in attacking a person with a 
deadly weapon, he will likely have “contemplated that life would be taken.” 
2. Cabana v. Bullock 
The 1986 decision in Cabana v. Bullock105 held that Enmund’s require-
ment that the defendant sufficiently participate in or expect the killing is not 
an element of the crime of felony murder that must be proven to a jury. 
Rather, the Enmund rule is a “substantive limitation on sentencing” imposed 
by the Eighth Amendment.106  Accordingly, even though satisfying Enmund 
requires a finding of fact, that finding may be made by a trial or appellate 
judge.107 
[T]he decision whether a sentence is so disproportionate as to violate the 
Eighth Amendment in any particular case, like other questions bearing on 
whether a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated, has 
long been viewed as one that a trial judge or an appellate court is fully com-
petent to make.108 
Cabana was, like Enmund, a 5-4 decision written by Justice White.109  Yet 
the other Justices in the majority in Cabana were the four who had dissented 
in Enmund: O’Connor, Rehnquist, Powell, and Burger.110  One of the major 
concerns expressed by Justice O’Connor, in writing for the Enmund dissent-
ers, had been that the proportionality of death to the defendant’s culpable 
mental state should be determined at the capital sentencing stage rather 
than in determining guilt for a death-eligible offense.111  Thus, in Cabana, 
Justice White was conceding that whether the defendant had killed, 
attempted to kill, or intended to kill could be a sentencing question rather 
than a guilt question, yet he continued to insist that death was disproportion-
ate for those outside this category. 
Justice White’s opinion contained some phrasing compatible with a 
mechanical reading of Enmund.  First, White contrasted the finding of dispro-
portionality in Enmund with the kind of “case-by-case, totality of the circum-
stances” finding made in Solem v. Helm (that a sentence of life without parole 
was disproportionate for passing a forged check):112  “Enmund, by contrast, 
imposes a categorical rule: a person who has not in fact killed, attempted to 
105 Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Pope v. Illinois, 
481 U.S. 497 (1987). 
106 Cabana, 474 at 386. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. Note, Cabana was unaffected by Ring v. Arizona, which explicitly discussed the 
prior case and did not alter its holding. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 598 (2002). 
109 See Cabana, 474 U.S. at 378. 
110 See id. 
111 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 828 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
112 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).  The majority in that case might not have 
agreed that its test, comparing the gravity of the crime, the severity of the sentence, the 
severity of sentences for similar crimes in other jurisdictions, and the gravity of crimes 
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kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be used may not 
be sentenced to death.”113  Justice White added that “[i]f a person sentenced 
to death in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, the Eighth 
Amendment itself is not violated by his or her execution regardless of who 
makes the determination of the requisite culpability.”114  It seems unlikely 
that Justice White meant that the Eighth Amendment has no requirements 
beyond the Enmund rule, or that it permits capital punishment for negligent 
homicide, but the sentence can be read that way.  On the other hand, 
White’s opinion reiterates his assumption that “killing, attempting to kill, or 
intending to kill” all permit execution insofar as they entail “the requisite 
culpability.” 
3. Tison v. Arizona 
The Court returned to the substantive development of the rule in Tison 
v. Arizona.115  In Tison, two brothers—Ricky and Raymond—involved them-
selves in a larger plot to break their father, Gary Tison, out of jail.116  After 
the brothers successfully infiltrated the prison and all three had escaped it, 
the group flagged down a car with passing motorists.117  After they trans-
ferred belongings to the new car, the problem of the still-living witnesses 
presented itself: 
Ricky Tison reported that [the father of the family of motorists] begged, in 
comments “more or less directed at everybody,” “Jesus, don’t kill me.” . . . 
[He then] asked the Tisons . . . to “[g]ive us some water . . . just leave us out 
here, and you all go home.”  Gary Tison then told his sons to go back to the 
Mazda and get some water.  Raymond later explained that his father “was 
like in conflict with himself . . . . What it was, I think it was the baby being 
there and all this, and he wasn’t sure about what to do.” 
The petitioners’ statements diverge to some extent, but it appears that 
both of them went back towards the Mazda . . . while . . . Gary Tison stayed at 
the Lincoln guarding the victims.  Raymond recalled being at the Mazda 
filling the water jug “when we started hearing the shots.”  Ricky said that the 
brothers gave the water jug to Gary Tison who then . . . went behind the 
Lincoln . . . [and] raised the shotgun[ ] and started firing.  In any event, 
petitioners agree they saw . . . their father brutally murder their four captives 
with repeated blasts from [his] shotgun[ ].  Neither made an effort to help 
the victims, though both later stated they were surprised by the shooting.118 
punished with similar severity in the same jurisdiction, was a “totality of the circumstances” 
standard. See id. at 292. 
113 Cabana, 474 U.S. at 386. 
114 Id. 
115 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
116 Id. at 139.  A third brother was also involved in the plot, who was later shot by 
police. Id. at 141. 
117 Id. at 139–40. 
118 Id. at 140–41 (fifth, sixth, and seventh alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
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The brothers were sentenced to death, despite the absence of evidence 
that they intended to kill.119  The Arizona Supreme Court offered the dubi-
ous theory that participation in a crime in which they knew someone could 
be killed constituted intent to kill.120  In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice 
O’Connor—who had dissented in Enmund—the Court rejected this effort to 
reconcile the Tison brothers’ death sentences with the rule in Enmund.121 
Nevertheless, the majority upheld the death sentences, revising the Enmund 
rule to permit execution of major participants in a fatal felony who acted 
with reckless indifference to human life.122  The majority included Enmund 
dissenters, Justices Rehnquist and Powell, newcomer Justice Scalia, and the 
author of Enmund, Justice White.123  The dissenters—Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens—had all been in the majority in Enmund, and 
had all dissented in Cabana.124 
The majority began its analysis with a discussion of Enmund.  The Court 
noted that that case “explicitly dealt with two distinct subsets of all felony 
murders”: the first subset involved “the minor actor [in a felony], not on the 
scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable 
mental state . . . . The Court held that capital punishment was dispropor-
tional in those cases.”125  The second subset involved “the felony murderer 
who actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.  The Court clearly 
held that . . . jurisdictions that limited the death penalty to these circum-
stances could continue to exact it in accordance with local law when the cir-
cumstances warranted.”126  The Tison defendants, the Court continued, fell 
in a gray area between the two, and thus Enmund did not dictate the 
outcome.127 
Critical to the majority’s perceived distinction were two categories: par-
ticipation in the killing, and the mental state with respect to the killing: 
“[The Tison brothers’] degree of participation in the crimes was major 
rather than minor, and the record would support a finding of the culpable 
mental state of reckless indifference to human life.”128  It was these two 
things that made Tison different from Enmund. 
The concept of participation was capacious, including both participation 
in the felony and participation in the killing.129  The decision identified as 
119 Id. at 143. 
120 Id. at 144. 
121 Id. at 138. 
122 Id. at 158. 
123 See id. at 138. 
124 See id. 
125 Id. at 149–50. 
126 Id. at 150. 
127 Id.  The Tison opinion did not, as did Enmund, use the term triggerman in such a 
way as to narrow the meaning of the category of “actual killers.” 
128 Id. at 151. 
129 Id.  See various representations throughout the opinion: “minimal participation in a 
capital felony,” id. at 147 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982)); “partici-
pation in the felony,” id. at 147; “degree of participation in the murders,” id. at 148 
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major participants offenders (such as the Tison brothers) who aided the kill-
ing by helping to capture victims or prevent their escape, remaining present 
when they were killed, and continuing their participation in the felony after-
wards.130  Just as the Enmund Court assumed that actual killers are highly 
culpable, the Tison Court assumed that “the greater the defendant’s partici-
pation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indif-
ference to human life.”131  Since the triggerman is obviously a “major 
participant” in a felony murder, Tison can be read to require that a trigger-
man must act with reckless indifference to human life to be capitally punisha-
ble for felony murder. 
As in Enmund, the majority then surveyed state laws.  It concluded that 
major participants in killing who were recklessly indifferent to death were, on 
the whole, subject to capital punishment.  It found “substantial and recent 
legislative authorization of the death penalty . . . under [such] circum-
stances.”132  Legislative changes were echoed by state high court 
interpretations.133 
Again, though, the majority’s final determination rested on its own anal-
ysis of retribution and deterrence, and this in turn centered on culpability:
 A critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability required 
in capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant commits the 
crime.  Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more pur-
poseful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, there-
fore, the more severely it ought to be punished.134 
But, Justice O’Connor reasoned, the Enmund formula assumed too dis-
tinct a dichotomy between intentional and unintentional killing, because not 
all intentional killers are sufficiently culpable to deserve death, while some 
unintentional killers are sufficiently culpable.
 A narrow focus on the question of whether or not a given defendant 
“intended to kill[ ]” . . . is a highly unsatisfactory means of definitively distin-
guishing the most culpable and dangerous of murderers.  Many who intend 
to, and do, kill are not criminally liable at all—those who act in self-defense 
or with other justification or excuse.  Other intentional homicides, though 
(emphasis omitted); “participation in the felony murder,” id. at 149; “degree of participa-
tion in the crimes,” id. at 151; “participation in the crime,” id. at 152; “participation in the 
felony murder,” id. at 153; “major actor in a felony in which he knew death was highly 
likely to occur,” id. at 154; “substantial participation in a violent felony under circum-
stances likely to result in the loss of innocent human life,” id., “participation in killing,” id. 
at 155, “participant in . . . robbery . . . [with] no evidence that defendant himself shot the 
guard but he did fire a weapon,” id.; “participation in these crimes,” id. at 158; and “partici-
pation in the felony,” id. 
130 Id. at 151, 155. 
131 Id. at 153. 
132 Id. at 154. 
133 Id. at 155. 
134 Id. at 156. 
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criminal, are often felt undeserving of the death penalty—those that are the 
result of provocation.135 
Justice O’Connor saw the Enmund formula as both underinclusive and 
overinclusive.  Moreover, she argued, “intent” did not capture the entire uni-
verse of death-eligible mental states: 
[S]ome nonintentional murderers may be among the most dangerous and 
inhumane of all—the person who tortures another not caring whether the 
victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the 
robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the 
unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim’s 
property.  This reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every 
bit as shocking to the moral sense as an “intent to kill.”136 
Notably, the examples of defendants who were and were not sufficiently 
culpable to deserve death were all actual killers.  The decision concluded that 
“major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indif-
ference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability require-
ment.”137  Yet it is important to remember that the opinion also refers to 
“participation in the felony murder” and sees such participation as evidence 
of “reckless indifference to human life.”138  Perhaps even more important is 
the qualification preceding the Court’s conclusion: “We will not attempt to 
precisely delineate the particular types of conduct and states of mind war-
ranting imposition of the death penalty here.”139  Even if Enmund’s holding 
can be read as a “categorical rule,”140 Tison’s superseding test clearly cannot 
be.141 
135 Id. at 157. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 158.  Recall earlier we noted the different possible levels or degrees of reck-
lessness. See supra note 11.  The Tison Court tended to use the term “reckless indiffer-
ence,” a term consistent with simple recklessness but, given the facts of the case, in a 
manner consistent with an implication of gross recklessness.  We address this ambiguity in 
detail later in the Article. See infra subsection III.B.2. 
138 Id. at 153. 
139 Id. at 158. 
140 Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986). 
141 The Court’s most recent characterization of the cases, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
describes the holdings as case-specific: 
[I]n Enmund v. Florida, the Court overturned the capital sentence of a defendant 
who aided and abetted a robbery during which a murder was committed but did 
not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing would take place.  On the 
other hand, in Tison v. Arizona, the Court allowed the defendants’ death 
sentences to stand where they did not themselves kill the victims but their involve-
ment in the events leading up to the murders was active, recklessly indifferent, 
and substantial. 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (citations omitted).  Importantly, Kennedy 
identified only “intentional first-degree murder” as an offense for which the death penalty 
was not excessive. Id. at 438.  This sheds light on the reference to Enmund. 
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4. Hopkins v. Reeves 
In a 1996 habeas corpus decision, Reeves v. Hopkins, the Eighth Circuit 
ruled that a defendant sentenced to death for felony murder in Nebraska 
had been improperly denied jury instructions on the lesser included offenses 
of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.142  Because these 
offenses required intent to kill, neither was ordinarily considered a lesser 
included offense of felony murder, which did not require such intent.  Yet 
the court reasoned that a finding of intent was required by Enmund and 
Tison for the defendant’s death sentence, even though he had killed the vic-
tims himself by fatally stabbing them: 
[T]he death penalty cannot be imposed on a defendant without a showing 
of some culpability with respect to the killing itself. Before a state can impose 
the death penalty, there must be a showing of both major participation in 
the killing and reckless indifference to human life. Enmund and Tison are 
thus independent constitutional requirements of the mental culpability a 
state must prove if it is to impose a death sentence; if the death sentence is 
to be imposed, the state must necessarily produce some evidence of intent 
with respect to the killing.  Nebraska’s rationale for prohibiting lesser 
included offense instructions in felony murder cases thus disappears when 
the defendant is sentenced to death.143 
In Hopkins v. Reeves, the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the cul-
pability required by the Eighth Amendment for the imposition of death was 
not an offense element, under Cabana v. Bullock.144  It followed that a capital 
sentence did not make felony murder a crime of intentional killing, and so a 
crime requiring intent to kill still could not be a lesser included offense of 
felony murder.145  In dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with the Eighth Circuit 
that “under Enmund v. Florida [the state could not impose the death penalty] 
without proving that respondent intended to kill his victim, or under Tison v. 
Arizona that he had the moral equivalent of such an intent.”146  Significantly, 
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion never challenged the assumptions of the 
Eighth Circuit and of Justice Stevens that Enmund and Tison required culpa-
bility on the part of actual killers. 
III. THE PROBLEM: HOW TO UNDERSTAND “ACTUALLY KILLED” IN LIGHT OF 
THE CULPABILITY REQUIREMENT 
So far, we have discussed how culpability justifies liability for the offense 
of felony murder, and also how the Eighth Amendment punishment analysis 
is similarly guided by culpability.  We have explained that because culpability 
and participation can vary so widely, there are special rules for the capital 
punishment of felony murder.  An offender cannot be death-eligible who has 
142 Reeves v. Hopkins, 102 F.3d 977, 986 (8th Cir. 1996). 
143 Id. at 984 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
144 Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 100 (1998). 
145 Id. at 99–100. 
146 Id. at 101–02 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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not “actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill”147 or acted with 
“major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indif-
ference to human life.”148 
It is now time to ask whether this doctrinal test created by the Supreme 
Court actually does the work it is supposed to do—whether the Enmund-Tison 
rule adequately assesses culpability.  What is immediately apparent is that one 
clause of the test seems to say nothing about culpability at all: “actually killed” 
(versus “intended to kill” or “attempted to kill”).149  We know that it is cer-
tainly possible to kill someone without intending it (say, in a car accident), 
and that this is also possible when committing a felony (say, in a car accident 
while a robber drives away from a bank robbery).  Thus, a mechanical read-
ing of the first clause of the test permits a result—capital punishment for the 
inadvertent actual killer—at odds with the rule’s justification.  Yet we shall 
see that a more reflective reading of the Enmund and Tison opinions is availa-
ble, which precludes capital punishment of inadvertent accomplices in felony 
murder without necessarily permitting capital punishment of inadvertent 
perpetrators of felony murder. 
A. The Mechanical Reading 
1. Actual Killing as Independently Sufficient: The Problem of the 
Inadvertent Actual Killer 
The mechanical reading takes “or” at face value and sees that word as 
creating a disjunctive test with four distinct and sufficient categories of cases. 
If an offender actually killed someone, the Eighth Amendment is satisfied; if 
he intended to kill, it is satisfied; if he attempted to kill, it is satisfied.  Moreo-
ver, if these requirements cannot be met, the punishment is still constitu-
tional if the conduct evidenced reckless indifference to human life and major 
participation in the felony.  The mechanical reading does not create a sliding 
scale of cases descending in egregiousness—it creates four different catego-
ries that need not relate to each other at all. 
Under this reading, the “actual killing” category neither explicitly nor 
implicitly requires culpability. This reading views this silence regarding 
mental state as an omission pregnant with meaning: it means that mental 
state is irrelevant. 
A chart will help to demonstrate the features of this type of mechanical 
reading of the Enmund-Tison test, where an “X” denotes eligibility for capital 
punishment. 
147 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 150 (1987). 
148 Id. at 158. 
149 Recall that attempt implies intent. See supra Part I. 
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FIGURE 1 
LOWER COURT OPINIONS 
Mens Rea (culpability) 




Major X X 
Killer X X X X 
The mechanical reading of Enmund and Tison permits execution of the 
actual killer irrespective of his intent to kill.  It permits capital punishment 
for those who kill without culpability or with only a negligent mental state. 
The tension between this result and the emphasis on culpability expressed in 
these opinions and in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence more generally 
leads us to question the validity of such an interpretation. 
2. The Problem of the Inadvertent Actual Killer Arises Because “Killing” 
Does Not Necessarily Imply Culpability 
Before discussing another way of reading the test, though, it is valuable 
to take a historical detour to trace the changing meaning of the term “kill-
ing” as homicide law evolved.  Execution of an inadvertent killer is possible 
under the mechanical reading of the Enmund-Tison rule because today, “kill-
ing” has no uniform definition. 
In using phrases like “kill,” “take life,” and “actually killed” in Enmund 
and Tison, the Justices likely envisioned a fatal intentional shooting.  After all, 
this is how the victims were killed in both of these cases.  Moreover, the most 
common felony murder scenario is an intentional shooting during a robbery. 
FBI data reveal that of the 1923 felony-type murders in 2010, 603 were perpe-
trated with a firearm during a robbery.150  The only other category that 
comes close is that of murders committed in the course of a narcotics 
offense, and of these 463, firearms were used for 391.151  The vast majority of 
felony-type murders involved weapons: seventy-two percent were shootings, 
ten percent were stabbings, and four percent were bludgeonings.152 
150 FED. BUREAU OF  INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM  CRIME  REPORTS: CRIME IN THE  UNITED 
STATES, 2010 tbl.11 (2010), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2010/tables/10shrtbl11.xls (listing murder circumstances by weapon). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. Note that when the FBI Uniform Crime Report counted homicides, this 
included murder and non-negligent manslaughter, so what counted for the national homi-
cide rate was anything a state happened to call “murder” under its own laws. See FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: VIOLENT 
CRIME (2010), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/violent-
crime/violentcrimemain.pdf . 
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Moreover, the term “killing” at one time connoted culpability on its own. 
In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries, “killing” was 
generally understood to mean causing death by intentionally inflicting a 
wound or injury.  “Malice,” the mens rea of murder in that era, meant an 
intention or expectation of doing physical harm, unexcused by provocation 
or self-defense.153  Indeed, “killing” was presumed malicious absent these 
excuses.154  A study of a cross-section of London homicide cases between 
1670 and 1830 found that fatal, unprovoked intentional stabbings, shootings, 
and bludgeonings almost always resulted in murder liability, without any fur-
ther evidence of intent to kill.155  Similar conduct resulted in manslaughter 
liability if the victim had provoked or invited combat.156 Thus, when eight-
eenth-century jurists asserted that all “killing” in the course of a felony was 
“murder,” they meant that a fatal intentional wounding was presumptively 
malicious, while a felonious motive would preclude a claim of provocation or 
self-defense, as the felony would justify resistance by the victim.157  Convic-
tions for deaths with more attenuated causation were unknown in the com-
mon law, “for the . . . death without the stroke or other violence makes not 
the homicide.”158 
Early nineteenth-century American lawyers still conceived the act of kill-
ing as necessarily entailing some measure of culpability by virtue of either 
violence or manifest danger.  An 1804 treatise on Kentucky criminal law 
defined “killing” as follows: 
[N]ot only he, who by a wound or blow, or by poison, or by lying in wait, or 
by strangling, famishing or suffocation, &c. directly causes another’s death, 
but also in many cases he who by wilfully and deliberately doing a thing 
which visibly and clearly endangers another’s life, thereby occasions his 
death, shall be considered to kill him.159 
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, scholars and judges re-
conceived the meanings of killing and malice and began to think of criminal 
offenses as culpably caused injuries more generally.  Accordingly, they began 
to conceive killing as simply the causation of death and malice as comprising 
153 See 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS 
OF THE  CROWN 36–44 (London, E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1736).  Indeed, killing was 
presumed malicious absent provocation or self-defense.  According to Edward Coke, 
express malice was an intention to “kill, wound or beat.”  3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 51 (London, M. Flesher 1794). 
154 4 WILLIAM  BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE  LAWS AND  CUSTOMS OF  ENGLAND 
*201 (1769). 
155 Of forty-three murders, twenty-four were by swords or other blades, nine by shoot-
ing, six by bludgeoning, two by strangling, one by poison, and one a prolonged beating of 
a child.  Guyora Binder, The Meaning of Killing, in MODERN HISTORIES OF CRIME AND PUNISH-
MENT 88, 95–101 (Markus D. Dubber & Lindsay Farmer eds., 2007). 
156 Id. at 101–02. 
157 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 280 (1978). 
158 HALE, supra note 153, at 426. 
159 HARRY  TOULMIN & JAMES  BLAIR, A REVIEW OF THE  CRIMINAL  LAW OF THE  COMMON-
WEALTH OF KENTUCKY 4 (Frankfort, W. Hunter 1804). 
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a number of culpable mental states, including intent to kill, intent to 
grievously injure, depraved indifference to human life, and intent to commit 
certain dangerous felonies.160 
Thus, while the earlier conception of killing guaranteed a measure of 
culpability, that is no longer true.  When killing no longer implies intentional 
wounding, or intentional use of a deadly weapon, but instead encompasses 
any causation of death, the term becomes unmoored from considerations of 
culpability.  Today there are four general approaches to defining the act ele-
ment of homicide offenses, roughly equal in popularity: (1) defining homi-
cide as causing death, and defining causal responsibility by statute;161 (2) 
defining homicide or particular homicide offenses as causing death, but leav-
ing the definition of causation to judicial elaboration;162 (3) defining homi-
cide offenses as killing;163 and (4) leaving such offenses as “murder” and 
“manslaughter” undefined by statute.164  Yet there is no association between 
particular definitions of the act and particular criteria of causal responsibility. 
Among jurisdictions imposing felony murder liability, causal responsibil-
ity takes two forms: “an ‘agency’ test that restricts liability to deaths directly 
caused by felons, and a ‘proximate cause’ test that includes all deaths 
foreseeably resulting from the felons’ acts.”165  An agency test might be 
thought to require the kind of culpability—intent to wound or injure— 
inherent in the concept of killing at common law.  For example, in the case 
of People v. Washington, the California Supreme Court overturned a robber’s 
conviction for the defensive killing of his co-felon by a robbery victim.166 
The court reasoned as follows:
 When a killing is not committed by a robber or by his accomplice but by 
his victim, malice aforethought is not attributable to the robber, for the kill-
ing is not committed by him in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate 
robbery.  It is not enough that the killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen 
and that the robbery might therefore be regarded as a proximate cause of 
the killing.  Section 189 requires that the felon or his accomplice commit 
the killing, for if he does not, the killing is not committed to perpetrate the 
felony.167 
This holding required that the act causing death have a felonious motive, but 
it also seemed to assume that the act causing death must be an intentional 
battery. 
160 See Binder, supra note 155, at 88; see also 3 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 80–81 (London, Macmillan & Co. 1883). 
161 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:11-2(a), 2C:2-3 (West 2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 2501(a), 303 (West 2013); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.01(a), 6.04 (West 2013). 
162 GA. CODE  ANN. § 16-5-1 (West 2013); N.Y. PENAL  LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2013); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01–09 (West 2013). 
163 CAL PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a) (West 2013). 
164 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (West 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-17 (West 
2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-30 (West 2013). 
165 Binder, supra note 16, at 484. 
166 People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965). 
167 Id. at 133. 
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If killing means causing death directly by intentionally striking a blow, it 
entails some culpability towards death.  Yet if killing is conceived more 
broadly, as including any conduct necessary to death, without the interven-
tion of another voluntary act, killing does not entail any culpability.  Thus, 
four years after Washington, a California court upheld a conviction for felony 
murder when a frightened victim died of a heart attack after a robbery, with-
out having been struck or injured by the robbers.168  The court held that 
direct causation did not require foreseeability of death and simply assumed 
that causation satisfied the statutory requirement of killing, despite the 
absence of any intentionally inflicted blow or injury.169 
A proximate cause standard requires that death be foreseeable, thereby 
requiring culpability towards death, but only at the level of negligence.  This 
is not enough culpability to justify capital punishment as necessary for pur-
poses of retribution or deterrence.170  A classic example of a proximate cause 
rule was the decision in the Illinois case of People v. Payne, in which a robber 
who exchanged gunfire with a victim was held liable for the death of his co-
felon, despite the absence of evidence to determine from whose gun the fatal 
shot emanated.171  Here the defendant’s recklessness made him responsible 
for the result despite the possible intervention of a victim.172  Yet a proximate 
cause standard can require much less culpability.  In the later Illinois case of 
People v. Hickman, an unarmed burglar was found liable for murder when a 
police officer shot an officer from another force investigating the same bur-
glary, after the defendant had already fled the scene.173  Because burglaries 
very rarely cause death,174 the defendant was arguably not even negligent 
(and probably should not have been convicted). 
Even this brief comparison shows that the act element of homicide varies 
from state to state, and even from case to case.  It may entail a lot of culpabil-
ity, or some, or none.  Depending on how it is applied by courts, a direct 
causation or “agency” standard may require intent to injure, or it may not 
require any culpability.  A proximate cause standard, properly applied, 
should require negligence towards death, but in practice sometimes it does 
not.  Neither standard for causation of death consistently demands reckless-
ness or intention with respect to death.  Thus, given current definitions of 
homicide, conditioning capital murder on “actually killing” cannot substitute 
for these culpable mental states.  It cannot escape the problem of the inad-
vertent actual killer. 
168 People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). 
169 Id. at 603. 
170 See supra Section II.A. 
171 People v. Payne, 194 N.E. 539 (Ill. 1935). 
172 Id. at 543. 
173 People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511 (Ill. 1974). 
174 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, at 38 n.96 (AM. LAW INST. 1980). 
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B. The Reflective Reading 
We have argued that to read the Enmund test mechanically permits the 
execution of an inadvertent actual killer, and that this troubling result is ena-
bled because state law provides no guarantee of an embedded culpability 
when the term “killing” is used.  Yet we also argue that the mechanical read-
ing is not compelled as a matter of constitutional doctrine (later, we will 
argue why it is wrong as a matter of constitutional theory).175 
1. Rereading Enmund 
A reflective reading of the Enmund opinion must begin with the identi-
ties of the signatories.  It included Brennan and Marshall, who consistently 
viewed capital punishment as unconstitutional in all circumstances, and 
Blackmun and Stevens, who late in their long careers would come to the 
same conclusion.176  All four of these Justices dissented in Tison, saying: 
Influential commentators and some States have approved the use of the 
death penalty for persons . . . who kill others in circumstances manifesting an 
extreme indifference to the value of human life.  Thus an exception to the 
requirement that only intentional murders be punished with death might be 
made for persons who actually commit an act of homicide; Enmund, by dis-
tinguishing from the accomplice case “those who kill,” clearly reserved that 
question.177 
Yet they went on to insist that “[i]n Enmund, the Court explained at length 
the reasons a finding of intent is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of 
the death penalty,” without confining that prerequisite, or its supporting 
rationale, to accomplices.178 
The author of the Enmund opinion was Justice Byron White.179  Justice 
White’s opinion in Enmund must be read against the background of his con-
currence in Lockett v. Ohio, striking down a death sentence for an accomplice 
who drove a getaway car.180  Justice White condemned the imposition of cap-
ital punishment on an accomplice without intent to kill in terms that strongly 
implied an across-the-board prohibition on executing anyone, including 
actual killers, without a finding of intent to kill: 
175 See infra Part V. 
176 See Elisabeth Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul Stevens’s Concurring Opinion in Baze 
v. Rees: A Fifth Gregg Justice Renounces Capital Punishment, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783, 791 
n.28 (2010) (identifying the opinions in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens first renounced the constitutionality of capital punishment). 
177 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 169 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted). 
178 Id. at 172. 
179 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 782 (1982). 
180 See generally Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 621–28 (1978) (White, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). 
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I agree with the contention of the petitioners . . . that it violates the Eighth 
Amendment to impose the penalty of death without a finding that the defen-
dant possessed a purpose to cause the death of the victim. 
. . . A punishment is disproportionate “if it (1) makes no measurable contri-
bution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than 
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is 
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.  A punishment might 
fail the test on either ground.” Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) 
(opinion of WHITE, J.).  Because it has been extremely rare that the death 
penalty has been imposed upon those who were not found to have intended 
the death of the victim, the punishment of death violates both tests under 
the circumstances present here. 
. . . . 
. . . It is clear from recent history that the infliction of death under circum-
stances where there is no purpose to take life has been widely rejected as 
grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the crime. 
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent to those lacking a pur-
pose to kill is extremely attenuated.  Whatever questions may be raised con-
cerning the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent to intentional 
murders . . . its function in deterring individuals from becoming involved in 
ventures in which death may unintentionally result is even more doubtful. 
. . . [T]he conclusion is unavoidable that the infliction of death upon those 
who had no intent to bring about the death of the victim is not only grossly 
out of proportion to the severity of the crime but also fails to contribute 
significantly to acceptable or, indeed, any perceptible goals of punishment. 
. . . [S]ociety has made a judgment, which has deep roots in the history of 
the criminal law, distinguishing at least for purpose of the imposition of the 
death penalty between the culpability of those who acted with and those who 
acted without a purpose to destroy human life.181 
These passages made no exception for actual killers, implying that execution 
should be conditioned on intent to kill for all defendants, even those whose 
actions caused death. 
When we turn to Justice White’s opinion in Enmund, we find that he 
identified two deficiencies in Florida’s capital punishment process: 
[U]nder Florida law . . . [i]t was . . . irrelevant . . . that he did not himself kill 
and was not present at the killings; also beside the point was whether he 
intended that the Kerseys be killed or anticipated that lethal force would or 
might be used if necessary to effectuate the robbery or a safe escape.182 
At the time Enmund was decided, thirty-five states and the U.S. military 
authorized the death penalty, but fifteen states, the United States, and the 
District of Columbia did not.183  Justice White noted that of those states 
181 Id. at 624–26 (citation omitted) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 
422 (1978)). 
182 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788. 
183 Id. at 789. 
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where the punishment was permitted, four did not punish felony murder 
capitally and an additional eleven required either intent to kill or “a culpable 
mental state . . . such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human life” 
as a prerequisite to capital liability.184  Thus, thirty-two jurisdictions pre-
cluded capital punishment of inadvertent actual killers.  Only one state 
required actual killing, while two more required major participation, and six 
more made minor participation a mitigating factor.185  Justice White added 
that of Florida’s forty-four other felony murder death row defendants 
(excluding Enmund), thirty-six had been found to have intended death, 
while no finding had been made with respect to intent in the other eight 
cases.186  Thus Justice White’s statistics supported a requirement of intent to 
kill much better than they supported a requirement of actual killing.  How-
ever, in defending the statistics supporting Enmund’s claim, White wrote, 
Nor can these figures be discounted by attributing to petitioner the argu-
ment that “death is an unconstitutional penalty absent an intent to kill” and 
observing that the statistics are incomplete with respect to intent.  Peti-
tioner’s argument is that because he did not kill, attempt to kill, and he did 
not intend to kill, the death penalty is disproportionate as applied to him, 
and the statistics he cites are adequately tailored to demonstrate that 
juries—and perhaps prosecutors as well—consider death a disproportionate 
penalty for those who fall within his category.187 
This is consistent with the inference that Justice White considered execu-
tion of unintentional killers to be cruel and unusual, but reserved the ques-
tion because it had not been sufficiently briefed and its resolution was not 
necessary to deciding the case.  In discussing the disproportionality of the 
death penalty to Enmund’s crime, however, Justice White emphasized 
Enmund’s lack of culpability far more than his lack of participation in the 
killing: 
The focus must be on his culpability . . . . It is fundamental that “causing 
harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same 
harm unintentionally.”  Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus his 
culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the 
State treated them alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those 
who killed . . . . This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.188 
Justice White then argued that the justifying purposes of capital punish-
ment required culpability.
 In Gregg v. Georgia the opinion announcing the judgment observed that 
“[t]he death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribu-
tion and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”  Unless the 
death penalty when applied to those in Enmund’s position measurably con-
tributes to one or both of these goals, it “is nothing more than the purpose-
184 Id. at 789–90. 
185 Id. at 791–92. 
186 Id. at 795. 
187 Id. at 796 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
188 Id. at 798 (citation omitted) (citing HART, 1st ed., supra note 68, at 162). 
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less and needless imposition of pain and suffering,” and hence an 
unconstitutional punishment. Coker v. Georgia, [433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)]. 
We are quite unconvinced, however, that the threat that the death penalty 
will be imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does not kill and 
has no intention or purpose that life will be taken.  Instead, it seems likely 
that “capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the 
result of premeditation and deliberation,” . . . . 
. . . . 
As for retribution as a justification for executing Enmund, we think this 
very much depends on the degree of Enmund’s culpability—what Enmund’s 
intentions, expectations, and actions were.  American criminal law has long 
considered a defendant’s intention—and therefore his moral guilt—to be 
critical to “the degree of [his] criminal culpability,” and the Court has found 
criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of inten-
tional wrongdoing.189 
Finally, contrary to the mechanical reading of Enmund, Justice White’s 
conclusion was not that any felony murderer was death-eligible who killed, 
attempted to kill, or intended to kill.  Instead, his conclusion suggested that 
Enmund’s death sentence raised two constitutional concerns: “Because the 
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the death penalty in this case in the absence 
of proof that Enmund killed or attempted to kill, and regardless of whether 
Enmund intended or contemplated that life would be taken, we reverse the 
judgment upholding the death penalty.”190  The first concern was that 
Enmund had not shown the seriousness of his culpable intent by committing 
conduct directly endangering the victim.  The second concern was the 
absence of any finding that Enmund had intended to kill or consciously 
adverted to a probability of death.  By expressing this additional concern in a 
separate clause, Justice White suggested that the Eighth Amendment also 
would not permit execution of an actual killer who had not adverted to a 
probability of death. 
These observations are strengthened when the petitioner’s brief and 
oral argument are considered.  The petitioner’s brief emphasized, as its first 
of three main arguments, that Enmund had no more culpability with respect 
to death than any other participant in a serious felony.191  The brief’s third 
argument was that capital punishment of unintentional killing served neither 
deterrence nor desert.192  At oral argument, the petitioner’s attorney, James 
Liebman, implied that actual killing was inculpatory only in so far as indicat-
ing intent to kill, that fatal but unintentional shooting would not justify capi-
189 Id. at 798–800 (first and fifth alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quot-
ing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976); then quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 
U.S. 463, 484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); and then quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 
421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975)). 
190 Id. at 801. 
191 See Brief for Petitioner at 14–15, 24–25, 29, 32–34, 40–41, 47–48, Enmund, 458 U.S. 
782 (No. 81-5321). 
192 Id. at 38. 
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 34 22-MAR-17 13:12
1174 notre dame law review [vol. 92:3 
tal punishment, and that at least recklessness should be required for actual 
killers.193  One of the Justices suggested to Liebman that the jury could have 
inferred intent to kill from Enmund’s participation in the robbery.194  When 
Liebman denied this, the Justice interjected, “[Y]ou don’t suggest that a per-
son has to pull the trigger himself,” to which Liebman responded, “Abso-
lutely not, Your Honor.  There can be an inference drawn from the fact that 
he pulled the trigger . . . that he intended, but there could be an inference 
drawn from many other factors even if he doesn’t pull the trigger.”195 
Another Justice broke in to ask, “[A]ssume in this case that Enmund was the 
only member of this group who entered the residence.  He was armed, but 
he had no intention to shoot, so he testified.  A struggle ensued in which . . . 
his gun went off accidentally.”196  Liebman responded, “[I]f the jury did 
determine that it was pure accident, that there was no intent, then the death 
penalty would be inappropriate because the jury would have thereby decided 
that this person was not at the intent level of culpability, but fell way below 
it.”197  Later, Liebman offered a fallback position: “Now, we think the intent 
line is best line, but there is also another line that would be a subjective state 
of culpability with regard to the homocide, [sic] be it recklessness, . . . some 
sort of awareness of it, and that was not found in this case.  It would be 
enough under the model penal code. . . . But it was not found here.”198 
Thus, the petitioner’s position, at least, was that actual killing in the course of 
an enumerated felony was capitally punishable only if it was at least reckless. 
2. Rereading Tison 
How should we best read Tison’s revision of the Enmund standard?  In 
approaching this question we should bear in mind that Tison was a 5-4 deci-
sion expanding the category of death-eligible accomplices recognized in 
Enmund.  This expansion depended on the vote of Justice White, who 
authored the majority opinion in Enmund and then switched sides, joining 
the Enmund dissenters, Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Powell.  As we 
have seen, Justice White, in Lockett v. Ohio, expressed the view that death-
eligibility should depend on intent to kill for all defendants.  The majority in 
Tison also depended on the vote of a Justice who had joined the court subse-
quent to Enmund: Justice Scalia.  As we will see in our discussion of the 1994 
case of Loving v. United States, Justice Scalia likely believed that Tison’s mini-
mum requirement of reckless indifference to human life applied to actual 
193 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Enmund, 458 U.S. 782 (No. 81-5321). 
194 Id. at 20.  The transcript does not identify the Justices. 
195 Id. at 21–22.  Based on the recorded voices of the Justices, the authors believe the 
Justice who posed the question about inferring intent to kill from robbery was the same 
one interrupting Liebman’s answer. 
196 Id. at 22.  Based on the recorded voices, the authors believe this was a different 
Justice. 
197 Id. at 23. 
198 Id. at 51. 
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killers.199  Without these two votes, Tison comes out the other way.  Moreo-
ver, the four dissenters in Tison—Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens—conceded that, in a case where the defendant tortured a victim to 
death or intentionally shot a robbery victim, “an exception to the require-
ment that only intentional murders be punished with death might be made 
for persons who actually commit an act of homicide; Enmund, by distinguish-
ing from the accomplice case ‘those who kill,’ clearly reserved that ques-
tion.”200  Thus, we have at least six Justices in Tison who apparently thought 
that actual killers needed to act with at least reckless indifference to human 
life to be death-eligible. 
Moreover, the approach of Tison indicates that the Court does not read 
its own opinions literally in this context. Tison represents a major revision of 
the Enmund test, a revision undertaken to reconnect that test with its underly-
ing justifications.  Recall that it was the Supreme Court in Tison that 
remarked that the Enmund test lacked the nuance to produce results in keep-
ing with its underlying justifications:
 A narrow focus on the question of whether or not a given defendant 
“intended to kill” . . . is a highly unsatisfactory means of definitively distin-
guishing the most culpable and dangerous of murderers.  Many who intend 
to, and do, kill are not criminally liable at all—those who act in self-defense 
or with other justification or excuse.  Other intentional homicides, though 
criminal, are often felt undeserving of the death penalty—those that are the 
result of provocation.201 
To read its own case literally was, the Court wrote, to use a “narrow 
focus” and a “highly unsatisfactory means” of achieving its ultimate pur-
pose—identification of “the most culpable and dangerous of murderers.” 
Tison itself tells us that no rigid test ought to supplant a deeper consideration 
of the rationale for the rule in the first place; it therefore invites its own 
further development in light of new fact patterns.  We might add that this 
kind of “common law” evolution of doctrine is especially appropriate in the 
context of the Eighth Amendment, where the touchstone of constitutionality 
is “evolving standards of decency.”202 
Moreover, upon close reading, Tison’s language resists the inference 
that killers are capitally punishable, regardless of culpability.  As we have 
noted, the opinion treats the degree of participation as significant primarily 
in so far as it correlates with culpability towards death: “[T]he greater the 
defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely he acted with 
199 See infra subsection III.B.3.  Apparently Justice Rehnquist also thought Enmund 
required culpability towards death for the actual killer, although, as a dissenter in Enmund, 
he may not have supported this requirement. See infra text accompanying note 221. 
200 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 169 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
201 Id. at 157 (majority opinion). 
202 Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2274 (2015) (emphasis added) (quoting Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)). 
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reckless indifference to human life.”203  On this reasoning the killer’s partici-
pation is significant as evidence—often conclusive—of reckless indifference. 
Consistent with this concern for culpability with respect to death is Jus-
tice O’Connor’s emphasis on the Tisons’ presence throughout the killings 
and the fact that they enabled the killings by providing the arms, flagging 
down the victims, and holding them at gunpoint while their father decided 
whether to kill them.204  Justice O’Connor added that “only eleven states 
authorizing capital punishment forbid imposition of the death penalty even 
though the defendant’s participation in the felony murder is major and the 
likelihood of killing is so substantial as to raise an inference of extreme reck-
lessness.”205  It seems clear that the participation justifying a lower standard 
of culpability with respect to death was participation in the felony murder, 
not participation in the felony as such.  To be sure, Justice O’Connor con-
cluded that “major participation in the felony committed, combined with 
reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund require-
ment.”206  Yet the argument of the opinion only justifies the conclusion that 
participation in the killing is probative.  Participation in the felony is proba-
tive only in so far as the felony recklessly endangered the lives of the victims. 
One of the foremost criticisms of felony murder liability is its imputation 
of complicity in the killing on the basis of aiding or encouraging the felony 
rather than aiding or encouraging the killing.207  It seems likely that Justice 
O’Connor sought to insulate capital punishment of felony murder from this 
criticism by conditioning capital felony murder liability on aiding and fore-
seeing the killing.  Underlying her dissatisfaction with the Enmund formula 
was its reliance on an unrealistically discrete category of killing.  As a former 
state judge she no doubt recognized that in modern homicide law, actors can 
become responsible for death under a variety of different standards of causa-
tion and complicity that are not uniform across jurisdictions. Accordingly, 
she treated participation in homicide as a continuum, and viewed it as signifi-
cant in so far as it supplied evidence of the culpability required for murder. 
Fatally shooting a victim would supply strong evidence of reckless indiffer-
ence to human life, but aiding or encouraging such an act might be just as 
inculpatory.  None of this reasoning implies that actual killers should be exe-
cuted when the “circumstances” did not so “warrant”208 by showing them to 
be “among the most culpable and dangerous of murderers.”209 
203 Tison, 481 U.S. at 153. 
204 Id. at 151–52. 
205 Id. at 154. 
206 Id. at 158. 
207 BINDER, supra note 33, at 213–25. 
208 “Enmund . . . dealt with . . . the felony murderer who killed, attempted to kill, or 
intended to kill.  The Court clearly held that . . . jurisdictions that limited the death penalty 
to these circumstances could continue to exact it in accordance with local law when the 
circumstances warranted.” Tison, 481 U.S. at 150. 
209 Id. at 157. 
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 37 22-MAR-17 13:12
2017] capital  punishment  of  unintentional  felony  murder 1177 
In its concluding section, Tison argued that nonintentional murders 
“may be among the most dangerous and inhumane of all,” and gave exam-
ples of torturers or robbers indifferent to the survival of their victims.210  Sig-
nificantly, the only examples offered of defendants culpable enough to merit 
capital punishment without intent to kill are actual killers.  In arguing that 
such killers are culpable enough to deserve death, the opinion eschews any 
argument that a fatal result makes culpability irrelevant, or that a felonious 
motive obviates any culpability with respect to death.  Instead, the Court lim-
ited its discussion to culpable mental states of sufficient gravity to warrant 
murder liability irrespective of felonious context.  Thus: 
This reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit as 
shocking to the moral sense as an “intent to kill.”  Indeed it is for this very 
reason that the common law and modern criminal codes alike have classified 
behavior such as occurred in this case along with intentional murders.  See, 
e.g., G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law § 6.5, pp. 447–448 (1978) (“[I]n 
the common law, intentional killing is not the only basis for establishing the 
most egregious form of criminal homicide . . . . For example, the Model 
Penal Code treats reckless killing, ‘manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life,’ as equivalent to purposeful and knowing killing”).211 
Moreover, the Court seemed to apply this requirement to those who 
actually cause death: 
[T]he reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in 
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly 
culpable mental state . . . that may be taken into account in making a capital 
sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though also not inevi-
table, lethal result.212 
Finally, we note that the majority opinion made no response to the claim 
by Justice Brennan in his dissent that the problem of the inadvertent actual 
killer was “clearly reserved” by Enmund.213  Brennan pointed out that the 
Tison majority’s discussion of unintentional killings was limited to that of 
reckless actual killers.  While denying that Enmund permitted execution of 
non-triggermen without intent to kill, Justice Brennan conceded that 
Enmund might permit execution of those who actually kill recklessly, because 
the question of the culpability required of actual killers had been reserved. 
Were the mechanical reading of the test such an obvious one, it would be 
expected that the majority opinion would have responded to Justice Bren-
nan’s claims.  Rather than insisting that actual killing alone sufficed to justify 
death-eligibility, Justice O’Connor sought to replace the rigid dichotomy of 
killing or intending to kill with a test better adapted to the disparate stan-
dards of homicide liability across the different states: death-eligibility 
required major participation in the conduct causing death, and reckless 
indifference to human life. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
212 Id. at 157–58 (emphasis added). 
213 Id. at 169 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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3. The Significance of Loving v. United States 
Finally, it is unlikely that the mechanical reading was contemplated 
because four members of the Court would later express skepticism at the 
prospect of the execution of the inadvertent actual killer.  This skepticism 
was evident not in a published opinion but at the oral argument in a military 
capital case (to be discussed in depth later).  This oral argument took place 
during the direct review of death sentence under the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice.214  On this review, the defendant challenged the military’s felony 
murder statute as failing to rationally narrow the death-eligible class of mur-
derers, as the President lacked the authority to prescribe the aggravating fac-
tors that purported to cure the statute’s defect.215  The Court ultimately 
decided that the President did have such power, thus obviating the need to 
assess the constitutionality of the statute on its own.216  What is important for 
our purposes, though, is that before reaching the separation of powers ques-
tion, the Court had occasion at least to consider the Eighth Amendment 
question.  Because the statute required no culpability with respect to the vic-
tim’s death,217 the Court was confronted with the problem of the inadvertent 
actual killer.  At issue was whether or not a triggerman in a felony murder 
could be liable under the statute even when he possessed no intent to kill. 
During oral argument, Justice Souter initially attempted to narrow the 
statute’s meaning to intentional killing, presumably to avoid the difficult con-
stitutional question that would otherwise result.218  When petitioner’s coun-
sel pointed out that intent was not required, Chief Justice Rehnquist jumped 
in, highlighting the resultant problem: “Enmund I think supports your posi-
214 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). 
215 Id. at 759. 
216 Id. at 770. 
217 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1982).  The statute provided: 
Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse, 
unlawfully kills a human being, when he— 
(1) has a premeditated design to kill; 
(2) intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm; 
(3) is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to others and evinces 
a wanton disregard of human life; or 
(4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, 
sodomy, rape . . . , robbery, or aggravated arson; 
is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may 
direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), he shall suffer death or 
imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct. 
Id. 
218 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, Loving, 517 U.S. 748 (No. 94-1966), https:// 
apps.oyez.org/player/#/rehnquist10/oral_argument_audio/20586 (“[I]t doesn’t dispense 
with a mens rea requirement, doesn’t it [sic]?” he asked.  “Because you still have the mens 
rea requirement necessary for murder.”  Petitioner’s counsel corrected him that “murder” 
was not an element, and Justice Souter responded, “[O]h, it says . . . merely says kills.” 
(alteration in original)). 
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tion there, that you can’t automatically transpose the mens rea for a felony to 
a killing and still have capital punishment for it.”219 
While questioning the Deputy Solicitor General, Justices Scalia and 
Breyer also raised the problem.  Justice Scalia asked if there was an intent 
requirement in the statute, since “[y]ou can perpetrate the killing without 
intending to kill.”220  The Deputy Solicitor General responded that there was 
none, to which Justice Scalia replied, “I guess that means [the statute] is . . . 
constitutionally invalid” for the purposes of “the death penalty.”221  Justice 
Breyer then said he was “with Justice Scalia, somewhat confused because . . . 
[the statute] does permit conviction of a person engaged in robbery who, 
let’s say, negligently . . . kills someone else,” and that therefore the death 
penalty could be imposed for merely negligent conduct.222 
Later, Justice Scalia again returned to the issue.  He asked the Deputy 
Solicitor General if “[a]ccidental killing would be enough to impose the 
death penalty under [the statute].”223  He introduced a hypothetical: “Sup-
pose I drop a gun during a holdup. The guns [sic] goes off and kills some-
body.  Is that enough to satisfy the requirements of [the statute]?”224 
Significantly, the Deputy Solicitor General then conceded that capital pun-
ishment for that conduct would violate the Eighth Amendment: “That . . . I 
believe that would be sufficient to satisfy [statutory liability].  It would not be 
sufficient to satisfy this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”225  Jus-
tice Souter then interrupted, rejecting the Deputy Solicitor General’s asser-
tion that any constitutional problem was solved if the defendant were the 
“triggerman,” since “[t]he triggerman can do it accidentally.”226  In such a 
case, the Deputy Solicitor General agreed that that scenario presented a “fur-
ther” constitutional question.227 
While all this language is nothing more than oral argument questioning, 
it cannot be ignored when attempting to assess whether the mechanical read-
ing was the anticipated one.  First, it is important to note that the govern-
ment conceded that accidental killing was insufficient for capital 
punishment.  Next, the Justices’ questions show that multiple members of the 
Court do not (and some of those on the Court for Tison “did” not) see them-
selves as authorizing the rigid mechanical test.  Dicta in the Court’s opinion 
implied an understanding of Enmund and Tison as requiring culpability, even 
for killers: 
[W]e agree with Loving . . . that aggravating factors are necessary to the 
constitutional validity of the military capital punishment scheme as now 
219 Id. at 8. 
220 Id. at 43. 
221 Id. at 44. 
222 Id. at 45. 
223 Id. at 28. 
224 Id. at 29. 
225 Id. (alteration in original). 
226 Id. at 30. 
227 Id. 
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 40 22-MAR-17 13:12
1180 notre dame law review [vol. 92:3 
enacted.  Article 118 authorizes the death penalty for but two of the four 
types of murder specified: premeditated and felony murder are punishable 
by death, whereas intentional murder without premeditation and murder 
resulting from wanton and dangerous conduct are not.  The statute’s selec-
tion of the two types of murder for the death penalty, however, does not 
narrow the death-eligible class in a way consistent with our cases.  Article 
118(4) by its terms permits death to be imposed for felony murder even if 
the accused had no intent to kill and even if he did not do the killing him-
self.  The Eighth Amendment does not permit the death penalty to be 
imposed in those circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 
(1982).  As a result, additional aggravating factors establishing a higher cul-
pability are necessary to save Article 118.228 
C. The Best Conclusion: An Open Question 
We have discussed one tempting way of reading the Enmund-Tison test— 
the mechanical reading—and explained what such a reading means in terms 
of applied results.  We showed that reading each clause of the test as an inde-
pendently sufficent path to constitutionality yields the problem of capital 
punishment of the inadvertent “actual killer.”  We noted the theoretical 
problem with reading the test this way (it ignores culpability) and showed 
how this problem arose because over time legal conceptions of “killing” have 
changed so that the concept no longer entails the culpability it once did.  We 
reviewed the leading contemporary tests for causation of death in the course 
of a felony—the agency and proximate cause tests—and showed that neither 
ensures a sufficient level of culpability to qualify felony murderers for capital 
punishment.  Finally, we turned to an explication of why the mechanical 
reading is not compelled as a matter of standard doctrinal interpretation, as 
evidenced by close readings of Enmund and Tison, the latter case’s unabashed 
modification of the former, and statements made at oral argument in Loving. 
If our critique of the mechanical reading is sound, however, then it must 
be replaced with something else.  What did the Court actually mean when it 
crafted its test?  Our position is that—at least with respect to the “actual 
killer” category and the problem of the inadvertent actual killer—the Court 
did not resolve the issue.  It was not directly before the Court in Enmund and 
Tison.  It seems likely that when both Enmund and Tison were decided, a 
majority of the Justices thought that execution of inadvertent actual killers 
would not serve the required purposes of retribution and deterrence.  Yet 
because Eighth Amendment proportionality had come to depend on evolv-
ing standards of decency, the Justices probably did not assume that their own 
views were controlling.  Moreover, in an era when public support for capital 
punishment had fluctuated dramatically, the Justices probably thought it 
imprudent to decide this question in the abstract. 
The Justices likely assumed that killings in the course of felonies would 
almost always be armed attacks manifesting recklessness.  Inadvertent killings 
would be rare, and prosecutors would seldom seek—and juries rarely 
228 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 755–56 (1996) (citations omitted). 
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impose—capital sentences when they did occur.  If a significant sector of the 
public believed that inadvertent killers merited capital punishment, such 
sentences would be imposed and challenged and come before the Court.  If 
not, the resulting silence would testify more convincingly than any judicial 
rhetoric to the indecency of such a sentence, should one ever be imposed. 
In short, they left the question of the inadvertent killer open, in the expecta-
tion that the convergence of usage with principle would answer it in due 
course. 
IV. THE PREVAILING INTERPRETATION IN THE LOWER COURTS: 
THE MECHANICAL INTERPRETATION 
We have argued that it is an open question whether a perpetrator of 
felony murder can be executed without a finding of at least reckless indiffer-
ence to human life.  Yet most state courts that have addressed the question 
have assumed that the Eighth Amendment permits such executions and, 
while the few federal circuit courts to consider the question are divided, the 
trend has been away from requiring culpability.  Decisions denying that the 
Eighth Amendment conditions execution of killers on culpability have 
almost uniformly employed the mechanical reading of Enmund.  A striking 
feature of these cases is that in almost all of them, the defendant is highly 
culpable.  Thus, the courts could easily have affirmed most of these death 
sentences as satisfying the culpability requirements of Enmund and Tison, but 
instead they denied that the Eighth Amendment requires culpability at all.229 
At the same time, some recent cases have presented scenarios of weaponless 
killings of vulnerable victims that raise real questions about whether the 
defendant adverted to the risk of death.  These cases illustrate that the pre-
vailing mechanical reading of Enmund and Tison creates a risk of executing 
an inadvertent killer that the Supreme Court should not disregard. 
In what follows, we will survey every case in the lower courts that has 
grappled with the inadvertent actual killer problem.  We will begin by discuss-
ing the small number of courts that apply what we call the “reflective read-
ing,” which demands culpability even for an actual killer.  However, we will 
then see that the weight of authority on this question skews heavily in favor of 
the mechanical reading.  Opinions employing the mechanical reading break 
out into three broad categories: most courts say Enmund and Tison permit 
the actual killer’s execution, some others say these cases do not apply to 
229 The fact scenarios in these cases support what we believe to be Justice White’s 
assumptions: that perpetrators of felony murder sentenced to death would be “trig-
germen,” would be wielding deadly weapons, and would almost always be at least reckless. 
This pattern strongly suggests that, despite claims by courts that the Eighth Amendment 
permits execution of inadvertent killers, inadvertent killers are almost never being sen-
tenced to death.  If so, conditioning capital punishment on at least recklessness is not only 
consistent with Eighth Amendment principles requiring that execution serve retribution 
and deterrence.  Requiring recklessness may also be consistent with evolving standards of 
decency as reflected in the discretionary decisions of prosecutors and sentencers. 
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actual killers, and a few say that we should rely on political process checks 
(and not legal rules) to prevent the execution of inadvertent killers. 
In discussing the cases below, we should clarify up front the spirit in 
which we craft our critique.  That the question of an inadvertent actual killer 
is not easily resolvable from a clear reading of Supreme Court cases shows 
that this is no simple question.  Indeed, as our discussion of California’s 
experience will show, conscientious judges can disagree sharply.  What we 
find troubling is not that a court can arrive at the wrong judgment in a hard 
case, but that so many courts have avoided exercising judgment altogether, 
and on a question of life and death. 
A. Reflective Reading 
A small number of courts recognize the problem of the inadvertent 
actual killer, as well as the ambiguity of Enmund and Tison on that question, 
and take into consideration the underlying justifications of the Eighth 
Amendment.  This interpretive approach leads these courts to demand that 
even an actual killer act with culpability with respect to the victim’s death. 
Shortly after the Enmund decision, the California Supreme Court was 
called upon to interpret its meaning in Carlos v. Superior Court.230  In this 
case, the court construed a popular initiative imposing capital punishment 
for felony murder to require intent to kill for “all defendants—actual killers 
and accomplices alike.”231  The court in Carlos was uncommonly astute in 
recognizing the problem of the inadvertent actual killer, even though the 
defendant in the case was merely an accomplice.232  “[The statute’s] applica-
tion to an actual killer who did not intend to kill would present a close and 
unsettled constitutional question.”233  The court considered at length the 
discussion in Enmund of culpability—both as a doctrinal requirement and as 
a theoretical justification for capital punishment.  The court perceptively 
noted, “The reasoning of [Enmund] . . . raises the question whether the 
death penalty can be imposed on anyone who did not intend or contemplate 
a killing, even the actual killer,” and stated that with respect to deterrence 
and retribution “there is no basis to distinguish the killer from his accom-
plice” if both lacked culpability.234  It called the inadvertent actual killer 
problem a “substantial and yet unsettled constitutional issue,”235 and it con-
cluded that because any test that allowed for execution of an unintentional 
230 Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862, 875 (Cal. 1983). 
231 Id. at 877. 
232 Id. at 875 (“Defendant did not kill, did not attempt to kill, and was not present at 
the time of the killing.  Nothing in the record suggests that he intended the death of 
Jennifer Slagle or any other person.  The most that could be said concerning defendant’s 
culpability for Jennifer’s death is that defendant knew his partner was armed, and may 
have contemplated that in an unexpected confrontation Perez would shoot and someone 
might be killed.”). 
233 Id. at 873. 
234 Id. at 875. 
235 Id. 
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killing did not advance the underlying justifications of punishment (and did 
not rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants), it would be 
unconstitutional.236
Also shortly after Enmund, the Eleventh Circuit decided Adams v. Wain-
wright,237 which involved the following facts: “In the course of a robbery at 
the victim’s home, Adams beat [the victim] senseless with a firepoker.”238
The victim languished for a day and then died.239  In sentencing Adams to 
death, the judge found the aggravating circumstance that the killing was 
“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” because the defendant beat the vic-
tim “past the point of submission and until his body was grossly mangled.”240
Nevertheless, the defendant challenged his resultant death sentence for fel-
ony murder because there was no specific finding of intent to kill, as 
required by Enmund.241  The court, however, distinguished Enmund not only 
on the ground that Adams actually killed, but also that he was more culpable: 
The Supreme Court held the death penalty disproportionate to Enmund’s 
culpability, reasoning that he personally “did not kill or attempt to kill” or 
have “any intention of participating in or facilitating a murder.”  Here 
Adams personally killed his victim, savagely beating him to death.  Adams 
acted alone.  He is fully culpable for the murder.242
Thus, while the Florida courts had made no explicit finding of culpabil-
ity, the Eleventh Circuit did test the sentence against the demands of 
Enmund. 
Following Wainwright in 1983 was Ross v. Hopper, another Eleventh Cir-
cuit case.243  During a home invasion, the defendant apparently shot and 
killed a police officer who answered a call from the house.244  Ross was con-
victed of felony murder, without any specific finding that he had killed, 
attempted to kill, or intended to kill.245  This was the basis of his Enmund 
challenge.  The court rejected this, noting the culpability of the defendant: 
[T]he individual culpability of appellant Ross is significantly greater than the
culpability of the defendant in Enmund.  There is sufficient evidence in the
record to support a finding that Ross not only contemplated that lethal force
236 Id. at 876 (“We doubt that a screening device which included those who killed acci-
dentally, while excluding some intentional killers, would meet the United States Supreme 
Court’s test.”) 
237 709 F.2d 1443 (11th Cir. 1983). 
238 Id. at 1445. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 1447 (quoting Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d 765, 769 (Fla. 1977)). 
241 Id. at 1446. 
242 Id. at 1447 (citation omitted) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 
(1982)). 
243 716 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1983). 
244 Id. at 1531. 
245 Id. at 1532. 
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 44 22-MAR-17 13:12
1184 notre dame law review [vol. 92:3 
might be employed during the robbery and hence possessed an intent to 
kill, but that he actually committed the murder himself.246 
While the court noted that the defendant “actually killed” the victim, it 
still examined the “individual culpability of the defendant, as did the 
Supreme Court in Enmund.”247 
In the year following Ross, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided Engberg 
v. State—another example (albeit a complicated one) of the reflective read-
ing.248  In Engberg, the defendant intentionally shot a robbery victim and the 
victim died.249  The defendant argued that a finding of intent to kill was 
required under Enmund.  The court distinguished Enmund as inapplicable to 
actual killers and non-accomplices, thus initially staking out what might seem 
like a mechanical interpretation.250  However, immediately after this, the 
court adverted to general Eighth Amendment principles and assessed the 
defendant’s culpability anyway, even citing to Enmund: 
In giving individualized consideration to the culpability of Engberg, follow-
ing the mandates in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 . . . (1976); 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 . . . (1978); and Enmund v. Florida, [458 U.S. 782 
(1982)], Engberg’s eligibility for capital punishment is sustained on the basis 
of his personal responsibility and moral guilt.  His conduct satisfies the “two 
principal social purposes” of the death penalty “retribution and deterrence 
of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”  [Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798], quot-
ing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 . . . (1976).251 
In Engberg, then, the court denied that Enmund’s requirement of intent to kill 
applied to a robber who intentionally and fatally shot a victim, but it never-
theless applied a requirement of culpability drawn from Enmund and other 
Eighth Amendment cases. 
246 Id. at 1532–33 (“Ross was seen standing in the dining room armed with Stanford’s 
.32 caliber pistol seconds before the shooting.  Witnesses testified that two rounds from 
Meredith’s shotgun were fired, followed immediately by a pistol shot.  Meredith’s body was 
found in the adjoining kitchen shot through the chest with a single bullet at close range. 
Ballistics tests later revealed that the bullet was fired from the same .32 caliber pistol seen 
in Ross’ possession seconds before the shooting.  Shortly thereafter Ross told his brother 
Theodore that he had shot a policeman and that the gun of his accomplice had misfired. 
He also told another witness that he thought he had killed a policeman.” (citing Ross v. 
State, 211 S.E.2d 356, 358 (Ga. 1974))). 
247 Id. at 1533. 
248 686 P.2d 541 (Wyo. 1984). 
249 Id. at 544. 
250 Id. at 551 (“The Supreme Court of the United States there held that a capital sen-
tence could not be imposed upon an accomplice convicted under a felony murder theory 
if the accomplice ‘does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place 
or that lethal force will be employed.’  Engberg in this instance did kill himself, and he 
would qualify for capital punishment under the holding in Enmund v. Florida.  Further-
more, Enmund v. Florida is an accomplice case, not a case involving a principal.  In our view 
it has no application to a case in which the defendant is the principal who accomplished 
the fatal act.” (citations omitted) (first citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 795–99, 
(1982); and then citing Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1983))). 
251 Id. 
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In 1985, another jurisdiction approached the actual killer question 
reflectively: Delaware.  In Whalen v. State, the defendant raped a very elderly 
victim and strangled her to death.252  He argued that the Eighth Amend-
ment required proof of intent to kill (recklessness had already been found, as 
this was required for guilt).253  The court distinguished Enmund because it 
did not involve an actual killer; however, this was not because of some 
mechanical interpretation given to the words “actually killed”— instead the 
court assumed that actual killers almost always have culpability, and therefore 
their execution serves the purposes of punishment.254  In discussing retribu-
tion, the court said: “From Whalen’s actions there can be little doubt of his 
intentions and expectations.  His culpability for the death that resulted here 
is far different from Enmund’s.”255  Since the facts here clearly evidenced 
intent to kill, there was no problem under Enmund: 
[T]he death penalty is not a grossly disproportionate and excessive punish-
ment for a defendant found guilty of felony murder, who actually killed his 
victim under the circumstances present here.  We note that such a conclusion 
comports with the requirement that a defendant’s punishment “be tailored 
to his personal responsibility and moral guilt.”256 
The court’s position was not that actual killing obviates inquiry into culpabil-
ity—instead, it was that the facts of an actual killing often provide evidence of 
culpability. 
Another 1985 case, this one from the Fifth Circuit, employed a similarly 
reflective reading of Enmund.257  In Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, the defendant 
stabbed a robbery victim, inflicting a mortal wound, but before the victim 
could bleed to death he was shot fatally in the head (by a co-felon).258  The 
defendant argued that a finding of intent was required but that the jury in his 
case was charged to find either specific intent to kill or intent to “inflict great 
bodily harm.”259  Essentially, he claimed that his knife attack was only com-
mitted with intent to “inflict great bodily harm,” while the co-felon’s gunshot 
was the actual cause of death.  Tellingly, the court rejected any distinction 
between killers and those who culpably aid in the killing: both were princi-
pals under Louisiana law.260  The mental element of murder in Louisiana 
was intent to inflict great bodily harm, which both assailants exhibited.  As for 
causal responsibility, it is true that where one assailant inflicts a mortal 
wound and a second independent assailant inflicts an immediately lethal 
wound, the subsequent independent act breaks the chain of causal responsi-
252 492 A.2d 552 (Del. 1985). 
253 Id. at 563. 
254 Id. at 564–65. 
255 Id. at 564. 
256 Id. at 565 (emphasis added) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 
(1982)). 
257 Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1985). 
258 Id. at 275. 
259 Id. at 287. 
260 Id. at 287–88. 
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bility.261  But where two assailants collaborate in an attack with deadly weap-
ons, each owns the other’s actions and both are causally responsible.  Thus, 
because Kirkpatrick was a participant in the fatal assault, he was causally 
responsible for the death: 
When a defendant personally intends to inflict great bodily harm and suc-
ceeds in producing death, his personal involvement and individual culpabil-
ity is sufficiently established that the capital sentence is not cruel and 
unusual. 
. . . The knife used in the assault was buried to the hilt in the victim’s chest 
and the victim had severe abdominal wounds.  Both wounds were potentially 
lethal.  The gunshot was but the coup de grace and Kirkpatrick cannot be 
exonerated even if he did not pull the pistol trigger.262 
Anticipating Tison, this case illustrates that when an accomplice in a felony 
(robbery, in this case) is also an accomplice in the killing, the distinction 
between accomplice and actual killer is unhelpful.  The only question that 
should matter for Eighth Amendment purposes is whether the defendant is 
sufficiently culpable.  The court concluded that Kirkpatrick’s capital sen-
tence satisfied Enmund—not because he was causally responsible, but 
because he was sufficiently culpable.  He did “intend . . . that lethal force 
would be employed,”263 indeed he intentionally used it264 and he “contem-
plated that life would be taken.”265  In saying that an intent to inflict great 
bodily harm was a sufficient level of culpability for a felony murderer who 
killed or was a principal in the killing,266 the court implied that Enmund was 
satisfied by a mental state of recklessness with respect to death for defendants 
causally responsible for the death, since great bodily harm poses an obvious 
danger of death. 
A 1992 Illinois case, People v. Ramey, also represents a reflective reading 
of Enmund.267  In Ramey the defendant was convicted of felony murder and 
sentenced to death when he fatally stabbed a victim during a home invasion 
robbery.268  His death sentence was overturned by the Illinois Supreme 
Court, though, for the court’s failure to instruct the jury to find intent to 
kill.269  Although the defendant was himself the killer, the court cited 
Enmund, reasoning that: 
261 BINDER, supra note 27, at 208. 
262 Kirkpatrick, 777 F.2d at 288. 
263 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797. 
264 Kirkpatrick, 777 F.2d at 288. 
265 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. 
266 Id. The Court’s complicated formulation was: “When the defendant himself acts 
with the intention of inflicting great bodily harm and either killed the victim or was a 
principal in his killing and was engaged in or was a principal in the commission of robbery, 
he has acted with personal culpability.” Id. at 287–88. 
267 603 N.E.2d 519 (Ill. 1992). 
268 Id. at 522. 
269 Id. at 540. 
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“A certain degree of culpable conduct is necessary, under the Federal 
Constitution, to warrant imposition of the death penalty . . . .” An essential 
element which the State was required to prove in order to establish the exis-
tence of the sixth aggravating factor—a culpable mental state—was not 
included in the instruction to the jury.270 
Here, the court interpreted Enmund to mean that culpability with respect to 
death is required—even for an actual killer.271 
The 1996 Eighth Circuit case, Reeves v. Hopkins,272 discussed above as the 
precursor to the Supreme Court case of Hopkins v. Reeves,273 also employed a 
reflective reading of Enmund and Tison.  In Reeves, the defendant—in an 
alcohol- and peyote-induced haze—stabbed one victim seven times with a 
kitchen knife, and also stabbed a second victim.274  The defendant argued 
that intent to kill was required, and the court agreed: 
[T]he death penalty cannot be imposed on a defendant without a showing of 
some culpability with respect to the killing itself.  Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782, 801 . . . (1982).  Before a state can impose the death penalty, there must 
be a showing of both major participation in the killing and reckless indiffer-
ence to human life. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 . . . (1987). Enmund 
and Tison are thus independent constitutional requirements of the mental 
culpability a state must prove if it is to impose a death sentence.275 
Thus, the court concluded that the combination of Enmund and Tison 
implied that a killer must act with at least reckless indifference to the victim’s 
death to be capitally punished.  The court seemed attuned to the underlying 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment in promulgating this interpretation, and 
noted that “the facts of this case . . . indicate the need for particular care that 
Reeves’s ‘punishment . . . be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral 
guilt.’”276 
Perhaps most emblematic of the reflective approach to the inadvertent 
killer problem is a 1998 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces.  The case at issue, Loving v. Hart,277 was a collateral attack on the 
death sentence upheld by the Supreme Court in the previously discussed 
Loving v. United States.278  It concerned the military’s felony murder offense:
 Any person . . . who . . . unlawfully kills a human being [while] . . . 
engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [a predicate fel-
270 Id. at 539 (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Jimerson, 535 N.E.2d 889, 905 (Ill. 
1989)). 
271 Id. 
272 Reeves v. Hopkins, 102 F.3d 977, 978 (8th Cir. 1996). 
273 See supra subection II.B.4; see also Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 99–100 (1998) 
(overturning the lower court decision because it read Enmund and Tison as affecting guilt-
stage liability for felony murder). 
274 Reeves, 102 F.3d at 978. 
275 Id. at 984. 
276 Id. at 985 (second alteration in original) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 
801 (1982)). 
277 47 M.J. 438 (C.A.A.F. 1998). 
278 517 U.S. 748 (1996); see supra subsection III.B.3. 
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ony] . . . is guilty of murder, and . . . shall suffer death or imprisonment for 
life as a court-martial may direct.279 
This provision appears to permit the death penalty for felony murder 
even without culpability with respect to the death.  The claim in Loving v. 
Hart was that one of the aggravating factors—that the offender be the “actual 
perpetrator of the killing”—was unconstitutional, as it required no finding of 
intent to kill or recklessness.280  The facts of Loving’s crime clearly evidenced 
an intent to kill—he entered a taxi, placed a pistol to the driver’s head, and 
shot the driver fatally after he was unable to produce money—but Loving 
contended that the lack of an intent requirement made the aggravator 
facially unconstitutional.281 
In considering this argument, the court of appeals directly addressed the 
constitutional problem of the inadvertent actual killer, and recognized that 
the Supreme Court had not clearly resolved the question: “Neither Enmund 
nor Tison involved an actual killer.  Thus, left unanswered after Enmund and 
Tison is the question whether a person who ‘actually killed’ may be sentenced 
to death absent a finding that the person intended to kill.”282  The court 
took seriously the Justices’ questions at the oral argument in Loving v. United 
States, especially Justice Scalia’s skepticism,283 and also noted Justice White’s 
earlier conclusion that “it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose the pen-
alty of death without a finding that the defendant possessed a purpose to 
cause the death of the victim.”284  These data points indicated to the court of 
appeals that “when Enmund and Tison were decided, a majority of the 
Supreme Court was unwilling to affirm a death sentence for felony murder 
unless it was supported by a finding of culpability based on an intentional 
killing or substantial participation in a felony combined with reckless indif-
ference to human life.”285  The court concluded that “the phrase, ‘actually 
killed,’ as used in Enmund and Tison, must be construed to mean a person 
who intentionally kills, or substantially participates in a felony and exhibits 
reckless indifference to human life.”286 
The court found anomalous the fact that the military’s murder statute 
made felony murder death-eligible, but not unpremeditated intentional 
murder:287 
This . . . would allow the death penalty for the person who unintentionally 
kills by firing through the ceiling during a robbery in an effort to scare the 
victim or someone whose intended victim dies of a heart attack during a 
279 Loving, 517 U.S. at 753–54 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1982)). 
280 Loving, 47 M.J. at 441. 
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 443 (citation omitted). 
283 Id.; see supra notes 208–13 and accompanying text. 
284 Loving, 47 M.J. at 443 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 624 (1978) (White, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment)). 
285 Id. 
286 Id. (citation omitted). 
287 See id. at 444. 
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robbery, but it would not permit the death penalty for a person who, without 
premeditation, intentionally kills.288 
And as so interpreted, the statute would violate the constitutional require-
ment that the class of death-eligible offenders be narrowed in the right way, 
since “there [must be] a rational connection between the level of culpability 
and the narrowing process.  In short, only the most culpable should be death 
eligible.”289 
Loving v. Hart represents the best effort by a lower court to address the 
conundrum of the inadvertent actual killer—not only to grapple with the 
plain language of the Enmund-Tison line of cases, but also to square the appli-
cation of their test with its underlying justifications.  For in felony murder 
cases, the court wrote, “the culpability requirement is part and parcel of the 
narrowing process.”290 
B. Mechanical Reading: Actual Killing as Independently Sufficient 
Under Enmund and Tison 
While the few courts discussed above interpreted the Enmund-Tison test 
in a reflective way, every other court has done so mechanically.  The first 
category of these mechanical readings involves cases holding that the test is 
satisfied by even an inadvertent actual killer.  Courts employing this interpre-
tation simply take the “or” in the test at face value, setting up the indepen-
dently sufficient category of “actual killer,” the plain meaning of which calls 
for no assessment of culpability.  This approach presumes that Enmund and 
Tison ruled that the Eighth Amendment permits execution of all killers as 
proportionate, and thereby places those cases in contradiction to other deci-
sions like Gregg, Lockett, Zant, and Roper that condition proportionality on 
careful consideration of culpability.  It reduces Enmund and Tison to for-
mulaic rules, rather than considering the Eighth Amendment principles that 
inform their reasoning. 
The first court to employ such a mechanical reading was the high court 
in South Carolina in 1982 (the same year Enmund was decided).291  In State 
v. Koon, the defendant kidnapped and strangled the victim to death.292  The 
defendant argued to the state supreme court that Enmund required intent to 
kill, but this was quickly dismissed by the court: 
Enmund held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit impos-
ing the death penalty upon one who aids and abets in a felony murder but 
who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill the victim. 





291 See State v. Koon, 298 S.E.2d 769 (S.C. 1982). 
292 State v. Koon, 328 S.E.2d 625 (S.C. 1985). 
293 Koon, 298 S.E.2d at 774. 
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While there was ample evidence of intent to kill, and of recklessness and 
depraved indifference, the court chose instead to find that Enmund was satis-
fied simply because the defendant “killed the victim.”294 
The next representation of this version of the mechanical reading came 
the year after Enmund in 1983, with the Alabama case Ex parte Dobard.295  In 
Dobard, the defendant shot a police officer at close range during a traffic stop 
while fleeing a robbery.296  He raised an Enmund claim, which the court con-
strued to mean that the death sentence was prohibited where “no evidence 
was offered to show that the defendant actually killed or intended to kill 
anyone.”297  The court dismissed this in only two sentences: “Overwhelming 
evidence of record shows that Dobard pulled the trigger, firing the shots that 
killed Officer Sudduth.  Consequently, we find no merit to petitioner’s con-
tention that Enmund . . . precludes imposition of the death penalty in this 
case.”298  Pulling the trigger and firing the shots—actually killing—is alone 
enough, and consideration of the triggerman’s culpability becomes irrele-
vant.  The “or” between “actually killed” and “intended to kill” is 
determinative. 
California, too, has adopted such a reading of Enmund and Tison.  Cali-
fornia earlier employed a reflective reading (in dicta) in Carlos v. Superior 
Court,299 but this was abandoned for a mechanical reading only four years 
later (shortly after Tison).  The California Supreme Court overruled Carlos in 
People v. Anderson,300 where Justice Mosk wrote that “intent to kill is not an 
element of the felony-murder special circumstance; but when the defendant 
is an aider and abetter rather than the actual killer, intent must be 
proved.”301  The court noted that its Carlos opinion was in accord with aca-
demic commentaries interpreting Enmund, as well as with Justice White’s 
statement in Lockett that capital punishment requires “conscious purpose.”302 
Yet Justice Mosk concluded that the decisions in Cabana and Tison showed 
these interpretations to have been mistaken.303 
First, the following pronouncement in Cabana seemed to hold special 
weight for Justice Mosk: “If a person sentenced to death in fact killed, 
attempted to kill, or intended to kill, the Eighth Amendment is not violated 
by his or her execution.”304  Justice Mosk wrote, “In these words the court 
294 Id. 
295 Ex parte Dobard, 435 So. 2d 1351 (Ala. 1983). 
296 Id. at 1353. 
297 Id. at 1357 (citation omitted). 
298 Id. (citation omitted). 
299 672 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1983).  This was in dicta (which has been discussed above), since 
Carlos involved an accomplice, and not an actual killer. 
300 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987). 
301 Id. at 1331. 
302 Id. at 1326. 
303 See id. at 1326–27. 
304 Id. at 1326 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cabana v. Bullock, 
474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986), abrogated by Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987)). 
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL304.txt unknown Seq: 51 22-MAR-17 13:12
2017] capital  punishment  of  unintentional  felony  murder 1191 
declared that the Eighth Amendment did not require intent to kill.”305  It is 
true that this reformulation makes explicit the negative pregnant implicit in 
Enmund’s holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids execution of one who 
has not killed, attempted to kill, nor intended to kill.  Yet it does not reveal 
whether in this context, “killed” should be read as excluding “attempted to 
kill” and “intended to kill,” or as including them. 
Justice Mosk also read Tison as “impliedly declar[ing] its disagreement 
with our reading of Enmund.”306  Why?  Because the Tison Court wrote that 
“the California Supreme Court in [Carlos] construed its capital murder stat-
ute to require a finding of intent to kill,” but “only did so in light of per-
ceived federal constitutional limitations stemming from our then recent 
decision in Enmund.”307  For the California court in Anderson, the word “per-
ceived” must have been pejorative—if “perceived,” then not “real.”  Even 
accepting that “perceived” means “misperceived,” the incorrect perception 
the Supreme Court was alluding to was that Enmund required intent to kill as 
a constitutional floor—the whole point of Tison was to lower that floor to a 
baseline of recklessness. Anderson reads Tison’s implication that intent is not 
necessary to mean that no culpability is necessary, but it does so only by ignor-
ing that case’s larger holding. 
The Anderson rule remains law, but the California Supreme Court did 
discuss the rule in light of new Supreme Court caselaw in 2013.  In People v. 
Contreras, the defendant killed a convenience store clerk with a shotgun dur-
ing a robbery.  Under the Anderson rule no finding of intent to kill was 
required.308  The defendant raised the same challenge made years before in 
Anderson, and the court rejected it by retreating to the standard form of the 
mechanical reading: 
Enmund’s limits on death eligibility and sentencing are “categorical.”  When 
such rules are stated in terms of the circumstances under which capital pun-
ishment is allowed, no constitutional violation occurs where the defendant 
“in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.” 
Accordingly, in the context of first degree felony murder, we have not 
conditioned capital punishment upon an intent to kill for actual killers.309 
It may be true that the Court in Cabana viewed the Enmund rule as establish-
ing a category of defendants who “may not be sentenced to death.”310  It 
does not follow that it thereby established three independent categories of 
defendants—including nonculpable killers—who may be sentenced to death 
with “no constitutional violation.” 
The mechanical interpretation evident in the Anderson case is also pre-
sent in various Oklahoma decisions.  Oklahoma has had several cases that 
305 Id. at 1327. 
306 Id. 
307 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 153 n.8 (1987). 
308 People v. Contreras, 314 P.3d 450, 457 (Cal. 2013). 
309 Id. at 480 (citations omitted) (quoting Cabana, 474 U.S. at 386, abrogated by Pope, 481 
U.S. 497). 
310 Cabana, 474 U.S. at 386. 
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stemmed from a child abuse murder statute that functions similarly to a fel-
ony murder rule.311  The offense reads as follows: “A person commits murder 
in the first degree when the death of a child results from the willful or mali-
cious injuring, torturing, maiming or using of unreasonable force by said 
person.”312 
In Fairchild v. State,313 the court employed the mechanical reading to 
hold that this statute requires no intent for an actual killer.  The Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals described the facts succinctly: “Three-year-old 
Adam Broomhall, who weighed 24 pounds, died as a result of brain damage 
caused when he was thrown against the vertical surface of the folded-down 
wing of a drop-leaf table by his mother’s live-in boyfriend, Richard Stephen 
Fairchild.”314  The autopsy revealed evidence of twenty-six separate blows.315 
Fairchild challenged his death sentence in part by arguing that the child 
abuse murder statute was unconstitutional—that “Tison . . . establishes the 
least culpable mental state sufficient for death eligibility as [recklessness].”316 
The court, however, quickly distinguished Tison.  “Tison is a felony-murder 
case in which the defendant himself did not kill.  This Court has found Tison 
does not apply to a defendant who, by his own hand, does kill.”317  Moreover, 
the case that does “apply” to an actual killer, Enmund, finds that category of 
cases to be constitutional: “This holding is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Enmund that the Eighth Amendment ‘requires that he 
himself [a death-sentenced defendant] have actually killed, attempted to kill, 
or intended that lethal force be used.’”318  Again, the “or” does all the work, 
and “actually killed” is read to mean simply causing death.319 
Next, consider the Tennessee case State v. Godsey.320  In Godsey, the 
defendant was convicted of felony murder with a predicate felony of aggra-
vated child abuse, after he threw a seven-month old infant onto a tile floor, 
causing a brain injury that eventually led to death.321  The defendant was 
charged with felony murder predicated on aggravated child abuse.322  He 
311 See, e.g., Abshier v. State, 28 P.3d 579 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001), overruled on other 
grounds by Jones v. State, 134 P.3d 150 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006); Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 
611 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999), as corrected on denial of reh’g (May 11, 2000). 
312 OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7(C) (2016). 
313 Fairchild, 998 P.2d at 611. 
314 Id. at 615. 
315 Id. at 616. 
316 Id. at 630 (citation omitted). 
317 Id. (citing Wisdom v. State, 918 P.2d 384, 395 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996)). 
318 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 390 (1986), 
abrogated by Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987)). 
319 However, the acts and causal process leading to death were clearly established, and 
the prolonged, escalating violence clearly shows recklessness and depraved indifference to 
human life. See id. at 616.  Had the court accepted the applicability of Tison to actual 
killers, its requirement of reckless indifference could easily have been satisfied. 
320 60 S.W.3d 759 (Tenn. 2001). 
321 Id. at 767. 
322 See id. at 764. 
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argued that the intent required for the predicate felony—knowing infliction 
of serious bodily injury—did not entail recklessness with respect to death as 
required under Tison.323  The court dismissed this argument on the now 
familiar ground that Tison applied only to accomplices: “Tison involved 
defendants who themselves did not kill the victims.  Here the defendant’s 
own actions killed the victim.  In [Enmund], the United States Supreme 
Court approved the imposition of the death penalty on the actual killer in a 
felony murder.”324  It is certainly not true that Enmund himself was the 
actual killer, so the court must have been referring to the formulaic three-
part test, and it must have employed the mechanical reading.  Most troubling 
about Godsey, though, is the court’s clearly mistaken view that the Tison 
threshold of recklessness with respect to death can somehow be met by the 
culpability with respect to the conduct of the predicate felony: “[T]he culpa-
ble mental state for aggravated child abuse, ‘knowing,’ is a higher standard 
than ‘reckless indifference.’  Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals cor-
rectly concluded that both the statutory elements and the facts of this case 
establish reckless indifference.”325  But Tison demands recklessness with 
respect to death, not recklessness with respect to serious injury.326  Still, the 
court might reasonably have argued that knowing infliction of serious bodily 
injury to a child implies reckless indifference to human life, and the court, to 
its credit, did observe that given the grievous nature of the head injury, “the 
facts of this case establish reckless indifference.”327 
Turning to federal courts, a 2003 Tenth Circuit case typifies the now 
prevailing mechanical reading: Workman v. Mullin.328  In Workman, the evi-
dence showed that the defendant caused three blunt head injuries to a two-
year-old child, equivalent in force to the fall from a two- or three-story build-
ing.329  The defendant was convicted under Oklahoma’s child abuse murder 
statute, on a theory of willful or malicious use of unreasonable force, and was 
sentenced to death on the basis of the aggravating circumstance that the kill-
ing was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”330 
Workman challenged the constitutionality of his death sentence by cit-
ing Enmund and Tison.331  The court could have easily answered this objec-
tion by finding recklessness based on the above facts.  Instead, however, the 
court concluded that “Workman’s crime falls into the category of cases under 
Enmund in which a felony murderer has ‘actually killed’ his victim.”332  This 
conclusion meant that the inquiry was over.  “The significance of falling into 
323 Id. at 773–74. 
324 Id. at 773 (citation omitted). 
325 Id. at 773–74 (citation omitted). 
326 See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. 
327 Id. at 774. 
328 342 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 2003). 
329 Id. at 1104. 
330 Id. at 1105 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (2016)). 
331 Id. (first citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987); and then citing Enmund 
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)). 
332 Id. at 1111 (citing Tison, 481 U.S. at 150). 
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Enmund’s category of when a felony murderer has ‘actually killed’ his victim 
is that the Eighth Amendment’s culpability determination for imposition of 
the death penalty has then been satisfied.”333  The circuit court took this view 
because it saw the test as “carefully formulated,” given its frequent repetition: 
“The phrase ‘actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill’ or varia-
tions thereof is repeated at least nine times in Enmund, is repeated at least 
three times in Tison, and is repeated at least twenty times in Cabana v. Bul-
lock.”334  The circuit court also included a citation to Cabana for its proposi-
tion, with a telling use of an ellipsis: “Cabana, 474 U.S. at 386, 106 S.Ct. 689 
(‘If a person sentenced to death in fact killed . . . the Eighth Amendment 
itself is not violated by his or her execution.’).”335  The full sentence in 
Cabana reads, “If a person sentenced to death in fact killed, attempted to kill, 
or intended to kill, the Eighth Amendment itself is not violated by his or her 
execution.”336  Thus, nothing mattered for the Tenth Circuit after the 
comma; the court read the plain language of “actually killed” to say nothing 
about culpability. 
An opinion from the Eighth Circuit agreed with this version of the 
mechanical reading: Palmer v. Clarke, from 2005.337  This was a later proceed-
ing of the Nebraska case of State v. Palmer, in which the defendant bound and 
then strangled a coin dealer to death during a robbery of the dealer’s 
house.338  While the facts seemed to show that this was an intentional killing, 
under state law the conviction and death sentence did not require any find-
ing of culpability.  The court denied that such a finding was necessary, 
because the “accurate statement of the Supreme Court’s test” in Enmund and 
Tison was that execution was unconstitutional “only when a defendant does 
not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place.”339  And, 
in keeping with the mechanical reading, the court viewed the first clause as 
an independently sufficient category: “Because the Nebraska Supreme Court, 
as well as the jury . . . determined that the record in this case showed that 
Palmer alone killed Zimmerman . . . , the death penalty may constitutionally 
be imposed upon Palmer.”340  To this court, conduct matters, not culpability. 
Most recently, Arizona has also adopted this version of the mechanical 
reading.  In the 2012 case of State v. Joseph, a killing took place during a 
domestic dispute in which the defendant broke into his estranged wife’s 
home and repeatedly shot her, her boyfriend, and her fourteen-year-old 
nephew, killing the nephew.341  The evidence clearly showed at least reckless 
333 Id. (citing Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986), abrogated by Pope v. Illinois, 
481 U.S. 497 (1987)). 
334 Id. (citations omitted). 
335 Id. at 1111–12 (alteration in original). 
336 Cabana, 474 U.S. at 386. 
337 408 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2005). 
338 399 N.W.2d 706, 712–13 (Neb. 1986) (per curiam). 
339 Palmer, 408 F.3d at 441. 
340 Id. 
341 283 P.3d 27, 29 (Ariz. 2012) (en banc). 
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indifference to human life—indeed, all but one juror who found felony mur-
der also found premeditation and intent to kill.342  However, Arizona pro-
vides an Enmund-Tison jury instruction during capital sentencing in cases 
only where the defendant is an accomplice in a felony murder, and the court 
denied that such an instruction was required for actual killers: 
The Eighth Amendment does not allow the death penalty to be imposed for 
felony murder unless the defendant “himself kill[s], attempt[s] to kill, or 
intend[s] that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed,” 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 . . . (1982), or is a major participant in 
the crime and acts with reckless indifference, Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 
157–58 . . . (1987).  Joseph does not dispute that he acted alone in killing 
Tommar.  Because Enmund allows imposition of capital punishment on a 
defendant who actually kills a victim in the course of committing another 
felony, the Eighth Amendment did not require that an Enmund/Tison 
instruction be given.343 
The court takes the “actually killed” category as independently sufficient 
to meet the constitutional requirements, without any consideration of mens 
rea, and it fails to mention or recognize the Eighth Amendment’s underlying 
justifications. 
C. Mechanical Reading: Enmund and Tison Are Inapplicable to Actual Killers 
While the above courts held that Enmund and Tison were not violated in 
cases of inadvertent actual killers, another group treats Enmund and Tison  as 
entirely inapplicable in actual killing scenarios.  In one sense, this reading is 
better: it acknowledges that Enmund and Tison left the question of inadver-
tent killers open.  Yet in another sense it is even worse: it presumes that if 
Enmund and Tison do not forbid the execution of actual killers, the Eighth 
Amendment has nothing to say about such executions. 
The first court employing this version of the mechanical reading was the 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in 1984 (two years after Enmund).  In 
Stewart v. State, the defendant shot the victim in the head twice during a bur-
glary.344  The defendant argued on appeal that Enmund required proof of 
intent to kill, but this argument was rejected because Enmund did not involve 
the actual killer: “We are not faced with the Enmund situation in the instant 
case . . . . Because there is evidence which shows appellant was the trigger-
man, we hold that Enmund v. Florida does not apply to the instant case.”345 
Only in cases “where the defendant was clearly not the triggerman” must a 
court take into account “the defendant’s culpability.”346  Instead of finding 
that the fact of a gunshot to the head clearly showed intent to kill and pre-
meditation, the court instead distinguished Enmund entirely. 
342 Id. at 30–31. 
343 Id. at 30 (first, second, and third alterations in original) (citation omitted) (citing 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797–98 (1982)). 
344 686 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc). 
345 Id. at 123. 
346 Id. 
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The next court to adopt such a reading was the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska.  In State v. Rust, the defendant shot several police officers and a 
civilian who came to their aid while in flight from a robbery.347  Rust 
appealed his death sentence, arguing that capital felony murder required 
intent to kill or premeditation, and cited Enmund for support.348  The court 
rejected this argument with the following reasoning: 
Enmund held only that the death penalty cannot be imposed on one who 
aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by 
others, but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing 
take place or that lethal force be employed. . . . [T]he trial evidence is that 
such is not the situation before us.349
While the evidence warranted the conclusion that Rust both killed and 
intended to kill, the verdict of felony murder did not require a finding of 
intent to kill.  The court apparently found Enmund inapplicable because Rust 
killed, irrespective of intent.  In any case, the Rust decision was so read in the 
later decision of State v. Palmer.350
The Eighth Circuit has at times interpreted the Enmund-Tison test in a 
similarly mechancial way.  In the court’s first encounter with the question—a 
1994 case entitled Murray v. Delo—the defendant participated in a robbery 
involving the deaths of victims, but he claimed that he did not kill or intend 
to kill any of them.351  Other evidence indicated that he shot the victims in 
the back.352  He raised an Enmund-Tison claim based on his version of the 
facts, but this was quickly rejected by the court: “We believe that his reliance 
on these cases is misplaced. Enmund and Tison are felony-murder cases 
which apply in situations in which the defendant was not the shooter.  As 
stated above, the evidence at trial indicated that the petitioner actually com-
mitted at least one murder, and perhaps both.”353  What is important for our 
purposes is not that the defendant’s legal challenge was based on an entirely 
different version of the facts, but that the court immediately assumed that 
neither an Enmund nor a Tison analysis was required in the case of the actual 
killer. 
Such reasoning was also employed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals in interpreting the state’s child abuse murder statute (discussed ear-
lier) in Wisdom v. State.354  The victim, a three-year-old child, died of a sub-
dural hematoma, with medical evidence indicating that the fatal wound 
could have resulted from an open-handed blow or from shaking.355  The 
defendant challenged the child abuse law as unconstitutional because it 
347 388 N.W.2d 483, 492 (Neb. 1986). 
348 Id. at 492–93. 
349 Id. at 493. 
350 600 N.W.2d 756, 769 (Neb. 1999). 
351 34 F.3d 1367, 1376 (8th Cir. 1994). 
352 Id. 
353 Id. 
354 918 P.2d 384 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996). 
355 Id. at 388. 
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required no intent with respect to the death of the child/victim.356  In a very 
brief discussion, the Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished Enmund and 
Tison entirely because they did not involve an actual killer:
 Both Tison and Enmund concerned situations where . . . a person who had 
not actually caused the injuries resulting in the victim’s death, was sentenced 
to the death penalty.  Appellant is the person who actually killed another, 
not the person who participated in a felony but who did not actually cause or 
intend to cause the death of another.357 
For this reason, the “death qualifying language” of Enmund and Tison ought 
not be “applied” to anyone who had actually killed.358 
A second Oklahoma case to consider here is Abshier v. State.359 Abshier 
involved the same child abuse murder statute as in Wisdom.  Unlike in Wisdom 
though, the facts of Abshier more obviously bespeak depraved indifference to 
human life.  The victim was a toddler, and medical evidence indicated nine 
separate head wounds with most of the skin on the victim’s face gone.360 
One medical expert believed the victim’s head had been stomped.361  The 
court reiterated its position that “the requirements of Enmund, [Cabana], 
and Tison do not apply [to an actual killer], and we need not determine 
whether Appellant was a ‘major participant in a felony and exhibited reckless 
indifference to human life’—he was the only participant.”362 
Like Oklahoma, Mississippi has also concluded that Enmund and Tison 
are inapplicable to actual killers.363  In Evans v. State,364 there was no ques-
tion that the defendant was an actual killer who possessed an intent to kill 
(he kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and strangled a ten-year-old girl),365 but 
356 Id. at 395 (“Appellant argues that the language in Enmund and Tison strongly indi-
cates that one who kills without an intent to do so or to cause major bodily injury, and who 
does not knowingly act with reckless indifference to human life, is not constitutionally 
eligible to receive the death penalty.”). 
357 Id. 
358 Id. 
359 28 P.3d 579 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. State, 134 
P.3d 150 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006). 
360 Id. at 587, 591. 
361 Id. at 591. 
362 Id. at 608 (citing Wisdom, 918 P.2d at 395).  The court also cited (and completely 
misread) Hopkins v. Reeves as if it supported its reading of Enmund and Tison. Hopkins 
held, consistently with Cabana, that the Enmund-Tison rule, stemming from the Eighth 
Amendment requirements for punishment, did not alter the substantive criminal law of 
felony murder in the states.  Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 99–100 (1998).  The Abshier 
court, though, took Hopkins to mean that, because Enmund created no culpability require-
ment for guilt, it created no culpability requirement for the Eighth Amendment. Abshier, 
28 P.3d at 609.  This reading is completely backwards. Hopkins said only that the culpabil-
ity required by proportionality did not affect the elements of liability, not that there was no 
longer any culpability required by proportionality. 
363 See Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613 (Miss. 1997). 
364 Id. 
365 Id. at 633. 
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he challenged the felony murder aggravator366 as unconstitutional because it 
required no finding of intent.367  The Mississippi Supreme Court saw no 
need to apply Enmund and Tison because, “unlike the defendants in [those 
cases], Evans was a major participant in a felony-murder and actually killed 
his victim.”368 
One final case should be considered in this category—the Tennessee 
case State v. Pruitt.369  The predicate felony was a robbery, specifically a 
carjacking.370  The court summarized the facts as follows: 
Mr. Pruitt ran up behind the older man and pushed him into the car. 
Although she could not see clearly into the car, it appeared to [the witness] 
that the two men were “tussling.” . . . After about fifteen seconds, she saw Mr. 
Pruitt throw the older man to the ground, slam the car door, and drive away. 
When Ms. Pruitt checked on the victim, he was shaking and having trouble 
breathing and he was bleeding from his nose and both ears.371 
The victim was a seventy-nine-year-old who later died from his injuries— 
injuries, perhaps, that would not foreseeably cause death to an average per-
son.372  The prosecution sought—and the jury found—the aggravating cir-
cumstance of a “knowing” killing by one having a “substantial role” in a 
predicate felony.373  Thus it may seem that this procedure satisfied the 
requirements of Tison or even Enmund, although the presence of “knowl-
edge” on these facts seems dubious.  However, the defendant argued that 
evolving standards of decency precluded execution of an inadvertent actual 
killer, which he claimed to be.374  This alternative manner of addressing the 
inadvertent actual killer problem was rejected, though, in the same way that 
the other challenges were rejected—because “Enmund and Tison addressed 
defendants who were accomplices to, but not perpetrators of, felony mur-
der.”375  This is the mechanical reading, applied in a different way. 
D. Mechanical Reading—Reliance on Process Checks 
Other courts employing the mechanical reading recognize the inadver-
tent actual killer problem, yet tolerate it because of their faith in process 
checks (prosecutorial and jury discretion, mitigation, appellate review, etc.) 
to prevent execution of inadvertent killers. 
366 MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(d) (West 2013) (“The capital offense was commit-
ted while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an 
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any [enumerated 
felony].”). 
367 Evans, 725 So. 2d at 682–84. 
368 Id. at 684. 
369 415 S.W.3d 180 (Tenn. 2013). 
370 Id. at 188. 
371 Id. at 187. 
372 Id. at 188, 218. 
373 Id. at 205. 
374 Id. at 210. 
375 Id. at 211–12. 
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A 1992 case from Tennessee, State v. Middlebrooks,376 is representative. 
In Middlebrooks, the state’s high court held that the felony murder statute was 
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment and the state constitution 
(which mirrored the federal) even absent a requirement of intent.377  Like 
Nebraska, Tennessee took the extreme approach of completely distinguish-
ing Enmund and Tison when the circumstances involved an actual killer.378 
Although the court recognized that this position was at odds with the Eighth 
Amendment’s underlying concern for culpability, the court put its faith in 
the appellate review process to prevent unjustified results.379  “Accordingly, 
rather than an absolute rule of per se disproportionality, this Court has in the 
past relied on its statutory duty of review . . . to assure that the sentence in 
each case is not disproportionate or excessive.”380  Any irrational selection of 
felony murderers for execution could be corrected on review, and the risk of 
such error was not substantial enough to change the rule itself. 
Similar reasoning was employed in the 1995 Maryland case of Brooks v. 
State.381  There, the female defendant, a recovering drug addict who had pre-
viously been a victim of sexual abuse, became enraged at a female housemate 
who she thought had groped her sexually.382  She bludgeoned her repeat-
edly with a metal tool until she died, and also wrapped an electrical cord 
around her neck.383  The jury convicted her of robbery and felony mur-
der.384  Brooks challenged her designation as death-eligible without a find-
ing of intent to kill.385  Specifically, she questioned whether the scheme 
sufficiently narrowed the class of death-eligible defendants in felony murder 
cases.386 
In determining death eligibilty, the court was faced with the question of 
culpability, given that felony murder requires no “proof of any particular 
mens rea [with respect to death].”387  The felony murder law made a homi-
376 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1992), superseded by statute as recognized in Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 
at 180. 
377 Id. 
378 See id. at 337 (“[Enmund and Tison] dealt with the problem of imposing the death 
penalty in cases of vicarious liability for felony murder, i.e., where an accomplice in the 
felony, one who did not actually kill the victim, is convicted of murder under the felony 
murder doctrine and receives the death penalty.”). 
379 See id. at 349 (Drowota, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
380 Id. at 340 (majority opinion). 
381 655 A.2d 1311 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), abrogated by Winters v. State, 76 A.3d 986 
(Md. 2013). 
382 Id. at 1313. 
383 Id. 
384 Id. at 1314. 
385 Id. at 1316 (“[A]ppellant contends that her entire sentencing proceeding was 
tainted because the judge improperly concluded that she was death-eligible,” and that 
therefore the court needed to “consider the constitutional validity of Maryland’s capital 
sentencing scheme.”).  Brooks was not sentenced to death, but challenged her designation 
as death-eligible. Id. at 1323. 
386 See id. at 1321. 
387 Id. 
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cide murder even if “the killing may have been . . . merely accidental,” and 
the trial judge seemed attuned to this problem.388  The Court of Special 
Appeals was able to avoid all these thorny problems of “personal conscience,” 
though, by taking note that “the Supreme Court has suggested that death 
may be imposed on the principal in a felony murder case without regard to 
mens rea,” and cited to Tison and Enmund.389  The court found it acceptable 
“that the felony murder rule creates a risk of imposing the death penalty for 
a killing that was truly accidental,”390 and cited to the facts of Stewart v. Mary-
land391—a case where the shock of a robbery caused a sixty-year-old motel 
desk clerk to die of an adrenaline-induced heart attack.392  The court con-
ceded that the defendant in Stewart could be sentenced to death under this 
regime it was approving, but that capitally punishing such an accidental 
death was permissible.393  This was because, although such an arbitrary death 
sentence was indeed a risk, it was not a “substantial” risk.394  The risk was 
insubstantial because (1) the statute allowed for a catchall mitigator (“any 
other facts that the jury . . . finds as mitigating”), and (2) the statute offered 
post-sentence review to determine if the evidence of aggravating circum-
stances outweighed the evidence of mitigating circumstances and if the sen-
tence resulted from passion, prejudice, or arbitrariness.395 Brooks, while 
recognizing the inadvertent actual killer problem and the attendant risk of 
an execution disproportionate to the offender’s culpability, opted to rely on 
process checks instead of an alteration of the rule itself.396 
Is this confidence justified?  It is probably true that few inadvertent kill-
ers are sentenced to death.  We will conclude below that very few capitally 
sentenced killers invoking Enmund and Tison on appeal or habeas corpus 
review, in fact killed inadvertently.397  It is also very likely that few of those 
inadvertent killers sentenced to death have been executed since only a small 
minority of death sentences—about one in six since 1976—have been carried 
388 Id. at 1317 (footnote omitted).  The trial judge had observed: 
This is one of the most troublesome areas of Maryland’s death penalty law to 
me because I can walk over to Mr. Dixon and I can say to him, Mr. Dixon, I hate 
you[, then] . . . I can kill him . . . . And under Maryland law I cannot be prose-
cuted and receive the death penalty. . . . But if in fact I say to him that I want his 
sixty-nine dollar watch and [I] . . . steal his watch and murder him, I can be 
prosecuted for the death penalty . . . . 
Id. at 1321–22 (quoting the lower court). 
389 Id. at 1322 (citation omitted). 
390 Id. 
391 500 A.2d 676 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985). 
392 Id. at 683; Brooks, 655 A.2d at 1322. 
393 Brooks, 655 A.2d at 1322. 
394 See id. 
395 Id. at 1322–23 (quoting MD. CODE  ANN., CRIM. LAW  § 413(g)(8) (West 1996) 
(repealed 2002)). 
396 See id. at 1323. 
397 Infra Section IV.E. 
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out.398  Yet defining inadvertent killing as capital murder does harm even 
when such killers are not executed.  It invites prosecutors to charge sus-
pected inadvertent killers with capital murder to induce favorable pleas, and 
diverts scarce capital defense resources.  If the rarity of executing a class of 
offenders justifies making those offenders death-eligible, then the Enmund 
Court should have declared nonculpable accomplices to felony murder 
death-eligible.  Instead, the Court viewed the rarity of capital punishment for 
this class of offenders as evidence that it violated evolving standards of 
decency. 
E. Summary 
Our survey of the lower court decisions interpreting Enmund and Tison 
in cases of actual killers revealed a dichotomy between a reflective reading, 
which saw culpability as required by the justifying purposes of capital punish-
ment, and a mechanical reading, which required only killing (irrespective of 
culpability).  The latter group divided into decisions that the Enmund-Tison 
rule (1) authorized execution of all killers, (2) did not apply to actual killers, 
or (3) was unnecessary for preventing execution of inadvertent killers. 
Overall, the weight of authority hews in favor of the mechanical reading. 
Twelve jurisdictions read Enmund and Tison mechanically; only six jurisdic-
tions read the cases reflectively.  Interestingly, there are some chronological 
patterns in the opinions discussed above.  While the reflective interpretation 
somewhat prevailed in the period between Enmund and Tison (seven opin-
ions versus three), after Tison the balance tipped heavily in favor of the 
mechanical interpretation (fifteen opinions versus two). 
398 From 1976 through 2015, there were 8087 death sentences in the United States. 
Death Sentences by Year Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo 
.org/death-sentences-year-1977-present (last visited Dec. 15, 2016).  There were 1422 
executions, resulting in an execution rate of 17.6%. Searchable Execution Database, DEATH 
PENALTY  INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions (last visited Dec. 
15, 2016). 
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It appears that, after Tison, lower courts became more reluctant to look to 
the underlying purposes of the Eighth Amendment when interpreting the 
felony murder test.  Instead, these courts often confined the Enmund rule to 
accomplices, finding that actual killers satisfied the test’s requirements 
automatically. 
This survey also reveals how few of the cases present facts that raise a 
genuine doubt as to whether the killer adverted to the danger of death.  Most 
of the cases involved intentional shootings (nine), strangulations (five), stab-
bings (four), or severe battering either of an infant or with a weapon, pro-
ducing a brain injury (six).399
FIGURE 3 











399 Note that this is one case fewer than above, as Carlos was an accomplice case. See 
Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1983). 
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In such cases, recklessness with respect to death is easy to establish, and could 
have been established by appellate review of the record.  Nevertheless, the 
courts ignored this option in the mechanical reading cases, opting either to 
find Enmund-Tison was satisfied by actual killers irrespective of culpability, or 
to find it entirely inapplicable to actual killers. 
The only two cases (classified as “other” in the chart above) that had 
even colorable claims of inadvertent killing were Pruitt and Wisdom.400 Pruitt, 
recall, presents what may be a common scenario for inadvertent killing in 
furtherance of a felony: a weaponless battery that unexpectedly leads to 
death due to the vulnerability of the victim (an elderly man suffering from 
coagulopathy, a condition similar to hemophilia).401  The victim suffered 
three distinct blows to the head, although it is unclear whether these came 
from punches or from being thrown against the car and ground.402  Simi-
larly, in Wisdom, the precise conduct leading to the death of the child was not 
established, and even the alleged conduct—either an open-handed blow or 
shaking—did not clearly evidence the conscious creation of a substantial risk 
of death.403 
V. CORRECTING THE MECHANICAL READING 
A. The Mechanical Reading Is Flawed: It Fails to Assess Culpability, 
and Is Therefore Irrational 
Although the Court held that Enmund could not be executed “absent 
proof that [he] killed or attempted to kill, and regardless of whether [he] 
intended or contemplated that life would be taken,”404 most lower courts 
have read the Enmund decision to allow execution of killers regardless of 
whether they intended or contemplated death.  However consistent the 
mechanical reading of Enmund and Tison may be with some language in 
those cases, it is inconstent with the Eighth Amendment principles on which 
Enmund, Tison, and other major cases rest.  Thus, the mechanical reading 
does not require that a defendant who caused death have done so culpably, 
but permits capital punishment in cases where a culpable mental state is 
entirely absent or where it falls below that level of culpability required for 
other murders.  Because the Constitution requires the rational selection of 
400 See Wisdom v. State, 918 P.2d 384 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Pruitt, 415 
S.W.3d 180 (Tenn. 2013). 
401 Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 187, 192. 
402 Id. at 205.  Arguably this case should have been overturned for insufficiency of evi-
dence.  Recall that Pruitt was convicted for “knowingly” killing, even though he had no 
knowledge of the victim’s medical condition. Id.  Even a Tison instruction conditioning a 
death sentence on a finding of reckless killing cannot prevent this kind of pro-prosecution 
jury nullification.  Appellate courts must also be willing to review such sentences for suffi-
cient evidence of recklessness. 
403 Wisdom, 918 P.2d at 384.  On the controversy over the reliability of evidence of 
lethal shaking, see generally DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY 
SYNDROME” AND THE INERTIA OF JUSTICE (2014). 
404 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (emphasis added). 
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the most culpable offenders for capital punishment,405 the mechanical read-
ing of the Enmund-Tison test violates the theoretical underpinnings of these 
cases. 
That the mechanical reading permits the execution of nonculpable kill-
ers is easily demonstrated by actual and hypothetical cases.  Most of the lower 
court cases interpreting Enmund and Tison in the mechanical way dealt with 
intentional or reckless killers whose legal challenges argued merely that a 
finding of intentionality or recklessness should have been made.  The facts 
are not always so clear-cut in felony murder scenarios, however.406  We could 
start with the list of hypotheticals (some drawn from actual cases) noted by 
Justice Broussard, dissenting in People v. Anderson: 
Among the cases now subject to the death penalty are the following: 
(a) A burglar startles a resident, who dies of a heart attack.  (Cf. People 
v. Stamp (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 203, 82 Cal.Rptr. 598.)407 
(b) A robber inflicts only a minor injury, but the victim dies weeks later 
of unexpected medical complications. 
(c) While defendant is on the way to committing an armed robbery, his 
gun fires accidentally, killing his accomplice.  (Cf. People v. Johnson (1972) 28 
Cal.App.3d 653, 104 Cal.Rptr. 807.) 
(d) While defendant is driving the get-away car, he causes an accident, 
killing a bystander.  (Cf. People v. Fuller (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 150 
Cal.Rptr. 515.)  Indeed the defendant would be subject to the death penalty 
even if he were driving carefully, so long as he could be said to be “the actual 
killer,” and even if his victim was the robber.408 
We can add other well-known felony murder cases drawn from criminal law 
textbooks.  In People v. Jenkins,409 a suspect was convicted of felony murder 
when he shook free from a pursuing officer who was brandishing his gun, 
with the result that the officer fatally shot his partner.410  In People v. 
405 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
406 Again, we emphasize that the vast majority of felony murders are intentional shoot-
ings, and recognize that these are outlier cases. 
407 Stamp—where the victim of the robbery was already in ill health (i.e., he happened 
to be an “eggshell” victim) and dropped dead of fright when the robbers entered his 
store—is arguably no longer good law in California, because the revised CALCRIM 540A 
would require proof that death was foreseeable. See People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Advisory Comm. on Criminal Jury Instructions, Judicial Council of 
Cal., Criminal Jury Instructions 2016, CALCRIM § 540A.  In addition, there remains a seri-
ous question—never litigated—as to whether Stamp could “kill” in the sense required by 
the holding in People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965), without a battery.  But the 
outcome of the case illustrates the possibility of a strict liability felony murder case that 
could constitutionally warrant the death penalty under the mechanical reading we critique 
here.  Felony murder convictions for spontaneous heart attacks are rare, but the Stamp case 
is hardly unique. See, e.g., People v. Ingram, 492 N.E.2d 1220 (N.Y. 1986). 
408 People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306, 1334–35 n.3 (Cal. 1987) (Broussard, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
409 545 N.E.2d 986 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
410 Id. at 989. 
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Matos,411 a fleeing robber was convicted of felony murder when a pursuing 
police officer fell down an airshaft.412  In Hickman v. Commonwealth,413 the 
defendant was convicted of felony murder because he was present while a 
companion took a moderate dose of cocaine, from which he unexpectedly 
overdosed.414 
These cases illustrate that permitting the execution of inadvertent felony 
murderers poses two risks.  One is that those executed will have less culpabil-
ity than the Eighth Amendment demands.  But, in addition, where culpabil-
ity is minimal, causal responsibility can also become highly attenuated.  If 
felons can be executed for causing death without any inquiry into their cul-
pability, there is a greater danger that they will be executed without having 
caused death at all.  Where a death results from excessive force or reckless 
pursuit by law enforcement, prosecutors may be especially tempted to deflect 
causal responsibility onto an arrestee for the death.415  The threat of a capital 
felony murder charge in such cases can force a guilty plea to a noncapital 
charge, concluding a travesty no reviewing court need ever see.  Thus, the 
mechanical reading can do real harm, even if few inadvertent killers are actu-
ally executed. 
The illogic of the mechanical reading is also apparent when we compare 
the inadvertent killings it condemns to the intentional killings Eighth 
Amendment law exempts from death.  Compare, for example, a robber or 
burglar whose intrusion triggers a heart attack in a homeowner416 to an abu-
sive husband who commits manslaughter by strangling his wife on learning 
that she plans to leave him.417  The former can be executed, but the latter 
cannot.  In California, a frenzied killer who stabs a child repeatedly is exempt 
from execution if he kills without the deliberation that would elevate a mur-
der to first degree.418  Yet, a robber or burglar who kills inadvertently is 
death-eligible in California without any further aggravation.419 
Once we disengage capital sentencing from considerations of culpability 
with respect to death, we find ourselves at war with our deeply held intuitions 
as well as with Eighth Amendment principles.  The point here is simple: if we 
must assess culpability in order to rationally select who should be executed, 
then any test that disregards culpability is bound to produce absurd results. 
411 568 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991). 
412 Id. at 684. 
413 398 S.E.2d 698 (Va. Ct. App. 1990). 
414 Id. at 699. 
415 See Alison Flowers, Charged with Murder, But They Didn’t Kill Anyone—Police Did, CHI. 
READER (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/felony-murder-police-
shooting-investigation/Content?oid=23200575. 
416 People v. Ingram, 492 N.E.2d 1220 (N.Y. 1986). 
417 People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976). See generally Victoria Nourse, Passion’s 
Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997) (noting 
frequent use of subjective provocation standards like the Model Penal Code’s to mitigate 
domestic violence homicides). 
418 See People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306 (Cal. 1987). 
419 See People v. Watkins, 290 P.3d 364, 390 (Cal. 2012). 
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B. The Solution: At Least Recklessness for All Cases 
We have thus far argued that the most prevalent interpretation of the 
Enmund-Tison rule in the lower courts—the mechanical reading—discon-
nects death sentencing from culpability for a category of offenders (those 
who “kill”) that it cannot define with precision.  It thereby violates Eighth 
Amendment principles requiring rational narrowing on the basis of culpabil-
ity in every case. 
If Eighth Amendment principles require some degree of culpability 
towards death for actual killers to become death-eligible, it is natural to ask, 
What degree of culpability?  We propose that the interpretation of the 
Enmund-Tison test that best reconciles both decisions with Eighth Amend-
ment principles would require at least reckless indifference to human life for 
every defendant sentenced to death for felony murder.  This reading of 
Enmund and Tison reconnects their test to an assessment of culpability, and 
so to the underlying justifications of the Eighth Amendment (deterrence and 
retribution).  A requirement of recklessness dispels the problem of the inad-
vertent actual killer, and also imposes a baseline mens rea across the some-
what disparate state law definitions of “killing.”  Moreover, it provides a 
principled way of narrowing the category of felony murders (which can be 
committed negligently) to those deserving greater punishment—those com-
mitted recklessly. 
In proposing this solution we do not oppose a more ambitious solution: 
requiring intent to kill for all capital murder.  This solution would have one 
distinct advantage, in that it would ensure that every death-eligible murder 
was in one respect more culpable than every murder that was not death-eligi-
ble.  By requiring that capital felony murders must also be intentional 
murders, this solution would ensure that capital felony murders would be no 
less culpable than noncapital intentional murders. 
Yet while a uniform requirement of intent would better fulfill the Eighth 
Amendment principles requiring rational narrowing on the basis of culpabil-
ity, and would accord with both the holding and the reasoning of Enmund, it 
would abrogate the holding of Tison.  While the Supreme Court may choose 
to overturn precedent by establishing a uniform requirement of intent to kill, 
lower courts are constrained from doing so.  By contrast, the solution we pro-
pose is an interpretation of Enmund and Tison that preserves their authority 
and extends their reasoning to an open question.  Indeed, it is a better inter-
pretation than the one that now prevails.  Accordingly, our proposal is one 
that state and lower federal courts can and should implement now even 
absent Supreme Court intervention. 
In offering this proposal, we recall the measured position offered by 
Enmund’s attorney in oral argument:
 Now we think the intent line is the best line, but there is also another line 
that would be a subjective state of culpability with regard to the homocide, 
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[sic] be it recklessness . . . some sort of awareness of it, and that was not 
found in this case.  It would be enough under the model penal code.420 
Similarly, we recall the concession of the four dissenters in Tison, that: 
[i]nfluential commentators and some States have approved the use of the 
death penalty for persons, like those given in the Court’s examples, who kill 
others in circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of 
human life.  Thus an exception to the requirement that only intentional 
murders be punished with death might be made for persons who actually 
commit an act of homicide.421 
If a requirement of recklessness is the most demanding standard the Court’s 
precedent will allow, it is also the least demanding standard the Court’s 
avowed principles can tolerate. 
1. Not a New Standard of Decency, Not a Necessary Interpretation of 
Existing Cases 
In advocating for our new solution, it is important that we explain what 
such a requirement would mean doctrinally.  As should be evident from our 
discussion of Enmund and Tison above, we do not argue that this is a neces-
sary or obvious reading of those cases.  Instead, we argue only that the appli-
cation of the Eighth Amendment to this class of cases was left open—that 
“Enmund, by distinguishing from the accomplice case ‘those who kill,’ clearly 
reserved” the question of an actual killer with a mental state less than that of 
intent.422 
Moreover, we do not argue (although we do not deny) that this pro-
posed requirement of recklessness even for the actual killer is a new Eighth 
Amendment principle that should now be imposed because of the emer-
gence, since Enmund and Tison, of an “evolving standard[ ] of decency.”423 
We believe that there is substantial support for this claim: our survey of cases 
found few instances of even arguably inadvertent killers who had been sen-
tenced to death.  Validating such a claim, however, requires searching analy-
sis of trends in executions, sentencing, and in state law that we do not 
undertake here.  The Court has given priority to demonstrations of compara-
tive disproportionality in declaring the application of the death penalty to 
particular classes of cases disproportionate.424  Thus it seems prudent for any 
litigant seeking to persuade the Supreme Court—or a lower court—to adopt 
a minimum requirement of recklessness for execution of felony murderers to 
420 Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (No. 
81-5321). 
421 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 169 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted). 
422 Id. 
423 See Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2274 (2015) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 321 (2002)). 
424 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 
for the methodology of reaching a new rule concerning the proportionality of applying 
capital punishment in a category of cases. 
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offer evidence that condemnations and executions of inadvertent killers are 
rare.  We believe such evidence is there to be found, but that is a topic for 
further research. 
In this Article, however, we advocate a uniform requirement of reckless-
ness (even for an actual killer) as a matter of doctrinal development that is 
necessitated by the Eighth Amendment’s underlying theoretical justifica-
tions.  Just as Tison refined the common law of the Eighth Amendment by 
providing a solution to cover a class of cases not considered by the Enmund 
court (non-triggermen who were nevertheless recklessly indifferent major 
participants), so do we call for a further refinement to exempt another class 
not yet addressed: the perpetrator of felony murder who causes death inad-
vertently.  Our proposed solution is simple: require recklessness in all cases, 
even for the actual killer. 
2. The Need for a Culpability Threshold 
First, we point out the need for at least some culpability threshold.  If 
capital punishment is justified by desert and deterrence, it ceases to be justi-
fied once culpability dips below a certain level.  Below we display a hierarchy 
of increasingly culpable mental states accompanying killing during a felony. 
Each is illustrated with both a hypothetical example and a real case.  These 
examples show that not all actual killings are equally culpable, so that a line 
needs to be drawn somewhere on the chart, above which killings should not 
be capitally punishable. 
FIGURE 4 
Actual Killing Hypothetical Real Case 
Negligent Young man throws down 
elderly woman during 
purse snatching; bound 
robbery victim dies of 
asphyxiation. 
State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 
180 (Tenn. 2013) (79-




Reckless Arsonist lights fire to 
vacation home even 
though car in driveway. 
Adams v. Wainwright, 709 
F.2d 1443, 1446–47 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (per curiam) 
(during burglary and 
robbery, prolonged 
beating of homeowner 
with iron poker, leaving 
body grossly mangled). 
Extreme Indifference Defendant drives car into State v. Joseph, 283 P.3d 
Type 1 (endangering a crowded lawn party he 27 (Ariz. 2012) (en 
multiple victims) has been excluded from. banc) (fires multiple 
shots at each of three 
victims). 
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Extreme Indifference 
Type 2 (recklessness + 
antisocial purpose or 
cruelty) 
Burglary victim dies while 
being tortured to force 
him to reveal 
combination of safe. 
Fairchild v. State, 998 P.2d 
611 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1999) (escalating abuse 
of crying three-year-old: 
repeated blows, burning, 
and finally throwing 
against table). 
Knowing Abusive parent refuses to 
feed baby for a week 
because it is crying. 
State v. Rust, 388 N.W.2d 
483, 492–93 (Neb. 1986) 
(fleeing robber shoots a 
pursuing civilian four 
times, including after he 
has fallen). 
Purposeful Convenience store 
robber shoots witness in 
the head. 
Loving v. Hart, 47 M.J. 
438, 441 (C.A.A.F. 1998) 
(shooting taxi driver in 
head when he had no 
money). 
As should be clear, the “actual killer” category is too broad to account for our 
more nuanced intuitions about desert; only by introducing culpability can we 
do this. 
But beyond these intuitions, a culpability threshold is also compelled by 
a combination of the same two principles announced at the outset of this 
Article: (1) felony murder liability is justifiable only when the defendant kills 
at least negligently with a felonious motive; and (2) the Eighth Amendment 
requires that death-sentencing involve a narrowing of the class of murderers 
according to a rational selection of the most culpable.  Properly defined and 
applied, felony murder liability guarantees us a baseline culpability of negli-
gence, but the Eighth Amendment requires that we “genuinely narrow the 
class of persons eligible for the death penalty and . . . reasonably justify the 
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others 
found guilty of murder.”425  Assuming felony murder liability is only justified 
for the (at least) negligent causation of death during the commission of a 
grave felony, the Eighth Amendment requires culpability greater than negli-
gence for capital punishment of felony murder. 
3. Recklessness Reconciles Precedent and Principle 
In light of these arguments, we must demand a threshold higher than 
negligence if we aim to satisfy the demands of Zant in a way that accounts for 
the underlying justification of felony murder liability.  This approach leaves a 
number of possibilities.  The Model Penal Code recognizes four mental states 
higher than negligence: recklessness, recklessness with extreme indifference 
(gross recklessness), knowledge, and purpose.426  Among these, the Supreme 
425 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). 
426 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1980). 
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Court has already made the choice for us—if recklessness is sufficient for 
execution of a major participant in felony murder (Tison), then it follows 
that recklessness is enough for the actual killer (who is certainly a major 
participant). 
Recklessness is usually defined as “consciously disregard[ing] a substan-
tial and unjustifiable risk,” (here, a risk of death).427  Thus, it goes beyond 
mere negligence, which requires only that the actor “should be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk.”428  Negligence blames an actor for unrea-
sonable ignorance of a risk, whereas recklessness requires conscious disre-
gard of that risk.  Thus, where the reckless actor adverts to danger and 
proceeds in the face of that knowledge, the negligent actor fails to advert to 
the danger at all.  Precisely because of this, criminal law has traditionally dis-
favored negligence for serious crimes, and made recklessness the usual base-
line level of culpability required to warrant severe criminal punishment.429 
When danger is knowingly imposed on others, however, unease at the pros-
pect of punishment drops away.  Thus, recklessness is made a default mental 
state in the Model Penal Code (to be employed when an offense definition is 
silent as to the required mental state corresponding to an objective ele-
ment).430  Infliction of our most severe penalty is far more acceptable for 
harm consciously risked than for harm risked inadvertently. 
We stop short of arguing for gross recklessness as a requirement.  The 
Model Penal Code conditions murder liability on this higher level of culpa-
bility, which it defines as recklessness combined with “extreme indifference 
to the value of human life.”431  As noted above, examples of this might 
include spitefully driving a car into a crowd of guests at a party, or causing a 
victim’s death during torture.  The Tison Court alluded to this mental state 
with the torture example, but then reverted back to regular recklessness 
when it promulgated its holding.432  This equivocation between simple reck-
lessness and gross recklessness probably can be explained by two related 
drawbacks of requiring gross recklessness in the context of felony murder. 
First, because gross recklessness is ambiguous, it is not a very adminis-
trable standard to use for constitutional review of the proportionality of 
death sentences in different jurisdictions.  Gross recklessness has many syno-
nyms: “extreme indifference,” “depraved indifference,” “wanton disregard,” 
and even “abandoned and malignant heart.”  These various phrases also have 
at least three meanings.  Recklessness or indifference can be gross, or 
extreme, or depraved because of (1) the scale of the known risk (more than 
427 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
428 Id. § 2.02(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
429 Id. § 2.02 cmt. at 229–44.  The Model Penal Code accepts negligence as a culpable 
mental state, but notes that this should be rare: “[N]egligence, as here defined, should not 
be wholly rejected as a ground of culpability that may suffice for purposes of penal law, 
though it should not generally be deemed sufficient.” Id. at 243–44. 
430 Id. § 2.02(3); KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 25, at 224–25. 
431 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1980) (murder). 
432 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987). 
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the substantial and unjustifiable probability required for recklessness, but less 
than the certainty required for knowledge); or (2) the number of people 
exposed to risk (such as the guests at a lawn party); or (3) the bad motive or 
purpose for which the risk is imposed (spite, sadism, coercion).  Thus a mini-
mum culpability of gross recklessness might be understood and applied dif-
ferently by different courts and legislatures, or different Supreme Court 
Justices.  A requirement of gross recklessness would therefore be ambiguous 
unless the Court arbitrarily chose one of these three meanings, to the detri-
ment of  jurisdictions that had chosen to define it differently. 
Second, one of the meanings of gross recklessness—recklessly imposing 
a risk for an evil or antisocial purpose—would normally be satisfied whenever 
someone kills recklessly in furtherance of an enumerated felony.  Accord-
ingly, by choosing recklessness as the minimum required culpability towards 
death for death-eligible felony murder, the Court can impose a clear and 
easily administrable requirement that achieves the same effect as requiring 
one variant of gross recklessness.  Consider the most common predicate felo-
nies for first-degree felony murder: robbery, arson, rape, kidnapping, escape, 
and burglary.  All of these involve a felonious purpose independent of physi-
cal harm to the victim.  Robbery aims at theft, arson at destruction of a build-
ing, rape at violation of sexual autonomy, kidnapping at violation of personal 
liberty, and escape at obstruction of law enforcement.  Burglary involves a 
trespass to property and usually aims at theft.433  One class of predicate felo-
nies likely to involve claims of unintended and even inadvertent killing is 
aggravated child abuse felonies.  While these felonies lack the kind of inde-
pendent felonious purpose that typifies robbery or rape, they often involve 
an antisocial purpose, such as sadistic cruelty.  Thus, by conditioning capital 
punishment of felony murder on recklessness towards death (along with a 
felonious purpose), the Supreme Court would be ensuring a finding of one 
form of gross recklessness in almost every case. 
Imposing a requirement of recklessness and felonious purpose for the 
execution of perpetrators would satisfy Eighth Amendment principles by 
serving the goals of deterrence and retribution. 
While there is little evidence that the death penalty deters, conditioning 
execution on reckless rather than inadvertent killing is at least rationally 
related to the goal of deterrence.  Any potential deterrent effect of a penalty 
for murder is undermined where the offender acts without any knowledge of 
the risk of causing death.  Deterrence theory presupposes that 
“[p]unishments are inefficacious when directed against individuals . . . who 
have acted without intention, [or] who have done the evil innocently, under 
an erroneous supposition.”434  It might be argued that the threat of execu-
433 Although it can be committed by unlawful entry for the purpose of aggravated 
assault, and it has been criticized as a predicate for felony murder under these circum-
stances. Compare Parker v. State, 731 S.W.2d 756 (Ark. 1987), with People v. Wilson, 462 
P.2d 22 (Cal. 1969), overruled by People v. Farley, 210 P.3d 361 (Cal. 2009), and People v. 
Farley, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
434 BENTHAM, supra note 14, at 322–24. 
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tion for inadvertent killing discourages predicate felonies, but for the inad-
vertent killer, the consequences of causing death cannot influence 
decisionmaking.  Even for serious crimes like robbery and arson, the chance 
of any one commission of the crime producing a death is very small.  Proba-
bly for that reason, felony murder liability has little proven deterrent 
effect.435  Yet for the felony murderer who knowingly imposes a risk of death, 
for example by intentionally shooting a resisting victim, the prospect of death 
is known, and the penalty for doing so should be salient. 
Requiring recklessness also serves retribution by requiring more culpa-
bility than is required for simple felony murder liability.  One study of popu-
lar views of desert found that experimental subjects supported a sentence of 
twenty-two to twenty-seven years for negligent killing in the commission of a 
robbery.436  These same subjects, though, supported a life term or a death 
sentence for intentional murder.437  Another study found that mock jurors 
were five times more likely to impose a death penalty for premeditated mur-
der in the context of a robbery than for an inadvertent shooting in the con-
text of a robbery.438  Presuming then that intentional felony murder is much 
worse than negligent felony murder, it seems that reckless murder is interme-
diate between the two.  In this sense, it meaningfully narrows felony murder. 
While requiring recklessness towards death for capital punishment of 
felony murder would serve deterrence and desert and meaningfully narrow 
felony murder, it seems that a requirement of intent to kill would advance 
these goals even more effectively.  By requiring intent to kill for all capital 
murders, the Court could ensure that every capital felony murder would be 
more culpable than every noncapital intentional murder, because it would 
combine intentional killing with the purpose of committing an independent 
serious felony.  Killings that recklessly endangered multiple victims or endan-
gered the victim for an antisocial purpose would not be death-eligible unless 
the victim was also killed intentionally.  In this way, capital gross recklessness 
murder would always be more culpable than noncapital intentional murder. 
Limiting capital punishment to intentional killers would therefore narrow 
capital punishment most effectively. 
To be sure, in Tison, Justice O’Connor reasoned that some grossly reck-
less murders—such as the unintended killing of a victim during torture—are 
more culpable than some intentional killings.439  She offered examples of 
justified, excused, and mitigated intentional killings, but even a premedi-
435 As for the somewhat fanciful theory that felony murder liability encourages commit-
ted felons to commit their crime more carefully, the only empirical study of the deterrent 
effect of felony murder rules on killing found none. See Anup Malani, Does the Felony 
Murder Rule Deter? Evidence from FBI Crime Data (2002) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265435387_Does_the_Felony-Murder_Rule_ 
Deter_Evidence_from_FBI_Crime_Data. 
436 ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 47, at 169–81. 
437 Id. 
438 See Norman J. Finkel & Kevin B. Duff, Felony-Murder and Community Sentiment: Testing 
the Supreme Court’s Assertions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 405 (1991). 
439 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987). 
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tated murder may be diminished in culpability by an altruistic motive of alle-
viating suffering.440  Nevertheless, even if some grossly reckless murders are 
more reprehensible than some intentional murders, intentional murders are 
generally more reprehensible than reckless killings.  As Justice White rea-
soned in Enmund, desert is generally thought to require that “causing harm 
intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm 
unintentionally.”441  Setting the minimum culpability requirement for capital 
murder at recklessness runs a greater risk that defendants will be executed 
for killings that are not the most culpable.  If we are only executing a fraction 
of a percent of the perpetrators of homicide, it seems reasonable to exclude 
anyone who killed unintentionally. 
The countervailing consideration is simply that the Supreme Court has 
already decided, in Tison, that reckless killing in furtherance of a predicate 
felony suffices for death-eligibility.  What the Court did not decide in Tison, is 
that “major participants” who kill can be executed without reckless indiffer-
ence to human life.  That question was not before the Court and has not yet 
been decided.  The many lower courts that have convinced themselves that 
the Court has authorized the execution of inadvertent killers are mistaken. 
In sum, Eighth Amendment principle demands that a culpability thresh-
old be imposed above that of negligence.  Recklessness and intent both sat-
isfy the demands of principle, but recklessness best reconciles principle with 
precedent.  It is the solution available to lower courts now, it is the solution 
more easily supported as an evolving standard of decency, and it is the solu-
tion that the Court can adopt without disturbing precedent. 
CONCLUSION 
We have shown that under the prevailing interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment in the lower courts, a defendant who participates in a felony and 
causes the death of a victim is eligible for the death penalty—even when the 
defendant acted without any culpable mental state with respect to the vic-
tim’s death.  This “mechanical reading” of Enmund and Tison is mistaken, as 
the underlying justifications of the Eighth Amendment require a rational 
selection of the most deserving offenders, and this in turn requires an assess-
ment of culpability.  The Supreme Court should address this open question 
in Eighth Amendment law by imposing a uniform requirement of at least 
recklessness with respect to death. 
440 See KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 25, at 339; 71-Year-Old Woman Gets Proba-
tion in the Mercy Killing of Her Husband, GAINESVILLE SUN, June 20, 1984, at 1B (covering the 
Dorothy Healy case). 
441 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting HART, 1st ed., supra note 68, 
at 162). 
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